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ABSTRACT
COMPREHENSIVE DESIGNS OF INNOVATE SECURE HARDWARE
DEVICES AGAINST MACHINE LEARNING ATTACKS AND POWER
ANALYSIS ATTACKS
Yiming Wen
Old Dominion University, 2020
Director: Dr. Weize Yu

Hardware security is an innovate subject oriented from growing demands of cybersecurity
and new information vulnerabilities from physical leakages on hardware devices. However,
the mainstream of hardware manufacturing industry is still taking benefits of products and
the performance of chips as priority, restricting the design of hardware secure countermeasures under a compromise to a finite expense of overheads. Consider the development trend
of hardware industries and state-of-the-art researches of architecture designs, this dissertation proposes some new physical unclonable function (PUF) designs as countermeasures
to side-channel attacks (SCA) and machine learning (ML) attacks simultaneously. Except
for the joint consideration of hardware and software vulnerabilities, those designs also take
efficiencies and overhead problems into consideration, making the new-style of PUF more
possible to be merged into current chips as well as their design concepts. While the growth
of artificial intelligence and machine-learning techniques dominate the researching trends of
Internet of things (IoT) industry, some mainstream architectures of neural networks are implemented as hypothetical attacking model, whose results are used as references for further
lifting the performance, the security level, and the efficiency in lateral studies. In addition,
a study of implementation of neural networks on hardware designs is proposed, this realized
the initial attempt to introduce AI techniques to the designs of voltage regulation (VR). All

aforementioned works are demonstrated to be of robustness to threats with corresponding
power attack tests or ML attack tests. Some conceptional models are proposed in the last
of the dissertation as future plans so as to realize secure on-chip ML models and hardware
countermeasures to hybrid threats.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 HARDWARE SECURITY

What is the trend of computer technology in the next decade? This holds a big question
mark for researchers for almost a century. The answer changes dramatically: from a huge
monster ENIAC to a cute Alexa set, from the rising of Moore’s Law to the prototype of
quantum computer, and even from an Intel 4004 with frequency at 104 kHz to an AMD
Threadripper 3970 with frequency at 4.6GHz. Questions come and go. The secure system,
however, holds its extraordinary vitality in every generation and grows up to a prosperous
subject, cybersecurity, today. Except for traditional software secure methods that are still
under updating to meet our current Internet environment, some innovate hardware-based
threats are recently proposed and request higher demands on hardware designs. Due to the
new hardware attacking methods and the increasing distribution of Internet of things (IoT)
devices, hardware security is proposed as an extended protection solution of conventional
software-based cryptographic system.
Different from conventional software-based threats, hardware threats aim at seeking for
vulnerabilities in signal leakage, design defects, and/or insert malicious hardware devices to
bypass software countermeasures in higher network layers. Due to the design demand for
better performance, most current chip designs tend to think little of protections of hardware
signals. Those physical leakages, in return, can be used for mathematical analysis and for
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further extraction of confidential information. Consequently, some countermeasures are
proposed to hide/encrypt those secrets in physical designs.
Although some models of threats and their countermeasures are presented and proved
to be of potential research value to cybersecurity studies, the industries are still not aware
of the importance of hardware protections in some ways. First of all, the investmentyield ratio is still the prior consideration of the market. The pursuit of Moore’s law is
not just for the need of higher performance but also for the commercial competition in
the chip market. If a secure hardware design consumes too much system source such as
area, power, heating, etc, the reduction of performance will drive consumers to select other
brands. Moreover, hardware threats have not caused severe secure information panic. This is
mainly because hardware-based attacks are usually stealthy and requires ancillary equipment
to extract and analyze physical signals, which makes information stealing from hardware
difficult to ordinary people. In addition, some hardware attacks like hardware Trojan can
only be implemented during fabrications. This means the reveal of vulnerabilities can only
be achieved by designers. The detection of the information leakage would cause excess costs.
Opposite to the sluggish reaction of the market, hardware threats develop greatly due
to the growth of advanced technologies. On the one hand, some work already proved that
physical threats combined with high-level anti-detection designs are more aggressive to confidential information [8, 9, 10]. On the other hand, machine learning (ML) introduces some
innovate vulnerabilities, giving even more challenges to secure hardware designs [11, 12].
As a result, comprehensive hardware security designs with considerations of both hardware
and software attacks would be the final solution to cater to the market. Limited by those
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conditions, it can be foreseen that future secure hardware devices should be of features that
include but not limit to:
• Design on existing functional devices instead of independent secure hardware modules.
Although independent hardware modules provide more secure protection mechanisms,
the overheads of speed, power, and area require hardware designers to sacrifice some
hardware performance to achieve the encryption standard.
• Considerations of jointly resisting side-channel attacks (SCA) and ML attacks. With
more IoT devices applied and distributed under unsupervised, leaked physical signal
can be targeted and extracted more easily. With the growth of ML technologies,
traditional countermeasures to SCA need to be redesigned to confront ML attacks.
• Detection of hardware Trojan need to be aware. Some pre-implemented hardware
Trojans tend to negate cryptographic modules.

1.2 SIDE-CHANNEL ATTACKS

Oriented from the natural flaws of switching characteristics in modern complementary
metal oxide semiconductors (CMOS), some features or functionality can be analyzed with
leaked physical signals. Depending on measurement equipment that is used by attackers,
heat, power, time delay, and many more measurement dimensions can be monitored by
attackers. Many published papers have proved that side channel attacks are of higher
efficiency to modern encryption systems [13, 14, 15, 16]. Among all attacking techniques of
side channel attacks, power analysis attacks are most referred and studied. Depending on
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complexity of attacks and types of analyzed power, power analysis attacks can be categorized
as simple power analysis, differential power analysis (DPA), and leakage power analysis
(LPA). Fig. 1.1 shows an experimental result of simple power analysis attacks [1]. In this
early study, it has been proved that the Hamming weight of the byte being processed is
proportional to the height of the power consumption pulse. However, due to the awareness
of power analysis attacks, current hardware designs are usually attached with SCA-resistant
designs at either circuit level and architecture level [17]. As a result, DPA and LPA are
mainstream researches of current side-channel attacks in which the former focuses on analysis
of relationship between confidential information and dynamic power consumption while the
latter cares more on mathematical analysis on static power traces. Comparing to DPA
attacks, LPA attacks are more dangerous to our cryptographic systems. Djukanovic et al.
[18] perform LPA attacks on various DPA-resistant logic styles and reveal LPA attacks are
effective in extracting confidential information in both CMOS bit sliced circuits and CMOS
combinational circuits (e.g., S-boxes).
Conventional countermeasures to power analysis attacks emphasize the reduction of dependency of side-channel leakage and power consumption profile. The power consumption,
first of all, can be mitigated by redesigning on CMOS devices. A well designed magnetic
tunnel junction CMOS can produce uniform power consumption during operation [19]. By
introducing user-defined security metric using constrained state assignment, the power footprint can be encoded [20], making it impossible to reveal the correlation between confidential
information and leaked power. A multi-core processor combining Random Dynamic Task
Scheduling, Random Dynamic Frequency Scaling, and Random Dynamic Phase Adjustment
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Fig. 1.1: Hamming weight information can be extracted from leaked signal of power consumption [1].

is proved to be of resistance to DPA attacks [21]. Although randomized input can be utilized
to arbitrary initial input values on an AES circuit [22], innovate power analysis methods
using convolutional neural networks [23, 24, 25] are still challenging hardware designers
to push the complexity of secure designs to a higher level. Other than the competition
to advanced attacking approaches, another straits in designing countermeasures to SCA is
the limitation of power budget and area restriction. Some researchers raise their ideas on
low-overhead secure designs to particular side-channel attack method [26, 27]. However, to
design an architecture to obstruct all potential physical leakages is still expensive.

1.3 PHYSICAL UNCLONABLE FUNCTION DEVICES

Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) devices are innovate circuit primitives that exploit
inherent manufacturing profess variations as natural random variables to realize some secure functions in physical level [28]. According to the specific architecture design, different
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physical parameters, such as voltage, time delay, frequency, etc., can be utilized as referred
variables in comparison. In this way, binary input sequences drive the designed PUF primitive to generate random outputs, which form the core security parameter called challenge
response pairs (CRPs). On the basis of the scale of generated CRPs, a weak PUF is defined
as a PUF that generates a countable set of obtainable CRPs, while a PUF primitive that
generate relative infinite CRPs is called strong PUF. With their inherent random feature,
the internal arithmetic logic and characteristic parameter are usually unpredictable until
the measurement collection after fabrication. Thus, each PUF is unique to its circuit layout
and is hard to replicate in practice. This makes PUF devices excellent candidacy in security
applications such as authentication, key generation, and noise generation [28, 29].
Up to date, variant PUF primitives are invented to meet the demand of different scenarios. Arbiter PUF [30] utilize delay features in logic gates and realize early strong PUF. A
SRAM-PUF uses the power-up states of a SRAM cell to realize logical PUF design, making
it a practical ID/key generator in micro-controllers. Besides, ring-oscillator (RO) PUFs are
inspired by its multi-input and lightweight features. It is also widely used as protection
mechanisms in distributed wireless sensor networks.
Nonetheless, associating with the spreading application of PUFs and the design of new
PUF primitives, what we cannot ignore are potential risks under attacks and the demand
of market. Initially, most proposed PUF designs rely on highly linear comparing logic,
which is usually vulnerable to machine learning attacks. Moreover, PUF devices are always
implemented as an independent security unit instead of a functional module that promote
performance of devices. This will obviously introduce considerable overhead and occupy
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system resources. Consider the contradiction to the pursuit of profits, only devices that
requires special protection or are exposed to a vulnerable environment will be allocated
with protections of PUFs. With the quickening spreading of IoT devices, more intelligent
devices will become preys of potential malicious attacks. Consequently, there is an urgent
need for a bran-new design standard for PUFs to accommodate the demand of security and
overhead.

1.4 MACHINE LEARNING

Machine learning (ML) is an interdisciplinary subject that exploits theories of probability, statistics, approximation, convex analysis, etc. to endow computers machines to imitate
human’s learning process from prior experience in order to obtain new knowledge or desired
functions. As a cutting edge technology in artificial intelligence, ML has been proved to be
beneficial in applications of medicine, genetics, data mining, and more promising research
fields [31, 32, 33]. According to the demand of tasks, data analysts are capable to design
their own neural networks and inject validating learning data that leads our machines to
achieve particular functions. Those learning processes are usually categorized as supervised learning and unsupervised learning that are practical in classification, regression, data
description, etc [34]. With the massive advent of software development environment/kits
[35, 36, 37], to design a customized network is no longer a monopoly to data researchers
and engineers. More educational resources are infused into this field, making ML a booming
industry and the hottest topic today.
However, just like every story that we learned from our history, a rising technology is
a double bladed sword. Except for the excellent performance in the technology revolution,
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we can never ignore potential risks since ML is also a dangerous tool for attackers. As
hardware security engineers, we know more about this. In this section, more details will be
highlighted in how ML is applied in defense and attack mechanisms.

1.4.1 MACHINE LEARNING ATTACKS IN HARDWARE SYSTEM

Early investigations of malicious hardware-based attacks tend to hypothesize that attackers extract physical signals from defects of designs and perform mathematical analysis
according to collected information. Recent studies [38, 39] demonstrate machine learning
models exhibit extensive potentials in data mining and analysis, extensively reducing the
time cost in extracting confidential information from physical signals. Owing to the cruel
environment of competition, devices’ resistance against machine learning attacks is proposed
as a new design criterion to all new secure hardware design. At present, the application of
machine learning attacks are usually categorized into two main aspects. One direction of
attacks attempts to adopt machine learning as auxiliary tools of mathematical analysis in
revealing secret information.
Fig. 1.2 shows an example of profiling attack using ML learning as its modeling tool.
The side-channel signals are initially collected from targeted hardware devices. By injecting
adequate number of input data and objective physical signals which contains potential correlation to confidential information, a training data set is thus established. In this case, the
constructed neural network is regarded as a black box whose learning results may describe
the relationship in given training samples. If the training dataset is large enough and the
network model is well constructed, the trained model should be capable in imitating the
inner logic of the cryptographic chip. By means of ML, attackers will no longer bother to
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(a)

(b)

Fig. 1.2: Profiling-based side-channel analysis attack using machine learning as modeling
tools: (a) profiling phase; (b) attack phase [2]

attempt different secret keys or build specific mathematical models. A well-trained model
is sufficient for attackers to manipulate the hardware system as desired.
Another malicious ML attack model that we have to face today is IC overbuilding, a
modeling attack that aims to crack the authentication system of PUF devices. The operation
of data extraction and model training are similar to aforementioned side-channel attacks.
In practice, SVM, logistic regression, and more advanced DNN architectures are used as
cracking models to PUF primitives.

1.4.2 MACHINE LEARNING COUNTERMEASURES IN HARDWARE SECURITY

By contrast, ML possess more extraordinary capabilities in designs of hardware security.
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One remarkable application is the detection of hardware Trojans. By implementing secret
extracting hardware part, hardware Trojans forms malicious inclusions in hardware system
that result in the degradation of performance or the failure of functions in hardware systems
[2]. Due to the increasing globalization of industry have been increasing, more third-party
manufacturers take part in the production of chips, raising risks that malicious inclusions to
be embedded onto the primary design. Hence, the detection of malicious inclusions comes to
be a pivotal mechanism in current hardware manufacture. On the basis of the dependence
of the usage of golden-chips, fabricated chips that is validated as free of the infection of
hardware Trojans, countermeasures to hardware Trojans can be classified as golden-chip
methods and golden-chip free methods. Benefiting from machine learning, the workload of
data analysis and feature extraction is greatly reduced. By using the divergences in power
consumption, [40] exploits support vector machine as a golden-chip based method. An ASIC
based implementation method of hardware Trojans is proposed in [41]. Simultaneously, a
comprehensive detection using SVM, PCA, and side-channel extraction is introduced by
the same team. In addition, more advanced researches of deep neural networks (DNN)
participate in the wrestle of confidential information. [42] introduces a method that optimize non-linearity after an initial PCA analysis on hardware Trojans. A BP network is
demonstrated to be efficient in accomplishing multiple Trojan detection works individually
[43]. This also proves neural networks have satisfying performances in self-learning and data
adaptions.

11
1.5 HARDWARE TROJANS

Hardware Trojans are malicious hardware inclusions that leak secret information, degrade the performance of the system, or cause denial-of-service [2]. With the promotion of
globalization and industrial cooperation, the production of a single chip may always involve
the engagement of third-party companies. Since the confidential information is always of
great appeal to attackers, commercial spies and alike information thieves tend to exploit
state-of-the-art technologies and seek unusual attack approaches and vulnerabilities to steal
confidential information. Under this background, hardware Trojans and their corresponding
detection theories are thus proposed.
Unlike aforementioned non-invasive attack models, like ML attacks and SCA attacks,
hardware Trojans is always implemented during fabrication process. For any ML attack
models or SCA attack models, approaches of data extraction, methods/tools of analysis,
targets of vulnerable architectures are mostly transcendental to designers or security engineers. Based on investigated vulnerabilities or accidents that happens, there are always
countermeasures that obstruct the attack procedure. The detection and removal of hardware Trojans, however, is extremely difficult and troublesome. First of all, those malicious
components can be very small comparing to the whole layout. Liu et al. propose two malicious inclusion designs that only introduce several diodes to achieve effective data extraction
[44]. The scale of Trojans means attackers do not greatly change the function or physical
signals. Thus, it is always difficult to be aware of the existence of Trojans.
Current studies of hardware Trojans pay more attention to detection of particular Trojan
types. And according to usage of golden chips, chips that are free from Trojan infection,
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detection approaches can be categorized as golden chip-based methods and golden chip-free
methods. As the name implies, golden chip-based methods require a bunch of chips that
are validated free from infection. By using secure reference group, the differences between
Trojan-infected chips and golden chips can be easily extracted when comparing physical
divergence in between. [40] utilize the frequency domain components of power consumption
traces as their reference variable and use support vector machine (SVM) to filter infected
chips. A Bayesian method is used to analyze current divergences in two groups [45]. The
execution path delay can also be used as examining variable. By using principle component
analysis (PCA), a divergence in time delay can be detected to categorize Trojan-infected
chips [46]. As for golden chip-free methods, the detection is mostly based on a known
parameter dimension that physical parameters may vary between/among target groups.
[44] utilize PCA as analyzing tool to map transmission power into three dimensional points
and finally classify chip samples into three groups (one Trojan-free and two Trojan infected).
Although a great number of papers are proposed on detection approaches of Trojan chips,
some defects still exist in their detection procedures. First of all, most Trojan detection
methods are proposed with a new Trojan design. Those methods are mostly valid only for
the proposed Trojan chips. Moreover, some Trojan detection method only focus on one
or two physical parameters. And that is under an assumption that attackers are using the
particular Trojan types. As for golden chip-free methods, most proposed work only use PCA
or SVM as feature extraction tools. Those methods do not specify the rationality that uses
ML models. And in reality, if the Trojan type is unknown, there is no guarantee that the
divergence signal can be truly extracted and used for further Trojan detection. Therefore, a
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general golden chip-free detection approach is still the ultimate goal in the research domain
of hardware Trojans.

1.6 OUR CONTRIBUTION

Consider the current development and bottlenecks of PUF devices illustrated in Section 1.1. The trends of future secure hardware devices should manage to elevate security
performance against potential attacks by means of hardware and software simultaneously.
In the meantime, the reduction of excess overhead is also an essential consideration. Therefore, we propose our improved designs of secure hardware devices. Our contribution in this
work is summarized as follows:
• Chapter 2 proposes an innovate design of physical unclonable function device against
machine learning attacks and side channel attacks.
• Chapter 3 investigates features of wave dynamic differential logic (WDDL) and propose
our design of a new PUF primitive against machine learning attacks and power attacks.
• Chapter 4 reviews drawbacks of two former designs and introduces a new floorplan for
PUF primitives, aiming at giving an ultimate solution to non-invasive attacks.
• Chapter 6 designs an innovate hardware Trojan for conventional PUF primitive. A
statistical method is proposed as new golden chip-free detection approach.
• Chapter 5 aims at vulnerabilities in profiling attacks and examine the effectiveness of
a new attack model that jointly use ML models and SCA models.
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• Chapter 7 summarizes all previous chapters and systematically integrates concepts of
designs, vulnerability detection, and performance evaluation into a whole.
• Chapter 8 exhibits reviews of our current work and future research plans after graduation are mapped out.
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CHAPTER 2

DESIGN AN INNOVATE PHYSICAL UNCLONABLE
FUNCTION DEVICE WITH VOLTAGE REGULATOR

2.1 MOTIVATION

On-chip workload-aware multi-phase voltage regulators (WAMPVRs) is a countermeasure to power attacks1 . Oriented from voltage regulation techniques, WAMPVRs aims at
mitigating output power profiles while keeping small, fast efficient, high power density, and
robust features of initial voltage regulators [48, 49]. By introducing random sequence control
scheme, the leakage power can be mitigated to an acceptable level as well as keep a high
power conversion efficiency. Converter-gating (CoGa) regulator [3] and converter-reshuffling
(CoRe) regulators [50] are two typical regulating techniques. Fig. 2.1 exhibits the base architecture design of CoGa regulator and CoRe regulator. Both architectures adopt similar
layout designs. In CoGa regulation scheme, the pseudo-random number generator (PRNG)
will act according to the change of output power. When the power demand does not change
dramatically, the control signal from the PRNG tends to remain unchanged to maintain
a stable output power profile. In CoRe regulators, however, the PRNG will take former
control signal as references. By keeping changing the input control sequence, the entropy
value of the input sequence is elevated and more randomness can be introduced to protect
the output power to be extracted and analyzed.
1

The content of this Chapter partially has been published in [47].
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Fig. 2.1: CoGa regulator in [3] (8-phase) introduces PRNG to realize the mitigation of
output power profiles.

In the aforementioned architecture of CoRe voltage regulator, the input sequence is under
controlled by a PRNG, which can be served as a binary sequence input. Besides, all flying
capacitors are interleaved with shifted clocks. If we take flying capacitors in each stage as
random outcomes of manufacturing fabrication and the capacitance discrimination can be
detected and compared, the output power should produce a sensible difference even two
identical input sequences are applied on two CoRe voltage regulators. Consequently, CoRe
voltage regulator can be easily redesigned as a new PUF. Since the new PUF is designed
on a functional device, the overhead of the PUF is greatly reduced compared to traditional
SRAM PUF, arbiter PUF, or ring-oscillator (RO) PUF. Those traditional PUF primitives
only provide security features which introduce losses in power and area. In this research,
we would like to provide an innovate thinking of PUF design, by which we can consider
whether we can design and implement PUF primitives on an existing device in our current
computer architecture.
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2.2 BACKGROUND

The workload-aware multi-phase voltage regulators (WAMPVRs) like converter-gating
(CoGa) voltage regulator [3] and converter-reshuffling (CoRe) voltage regulator [50] are
designed based on multi-phase switched capacitor (SC) voltage converters. Integrating
WAMPVRs fully on-chip is an efficient solution for reducing the power conversion loss and
strengthening the robustness of modern ICs against power attacks [3, 50]. As demonstrated
in [3, 50], increasing the total number of phases for the WAMPVRs can result in significant
improvements of the power conversion efficiency and the security against power attacks.
Accordingly, the designs of on-chip voltage regulators with more than 120 phases have been
frequently reported in the recent literatures [51, 52].
In the design of a 2:1 (Input voltage/output voltage = 2:1) 32-phase on-chip SC voltage
converter, the simulated output voltage ripples are shown in Fig. 2.2. Case 1 (as shown
in Fig. 2.2(a)) and Case 2 (as shown in Fig. 2.2(b)) indicate that different number of activated phases can generate different output voltage ripple signatures. Furthermore, when
we compare Case 2 with Case 3 in Fig. 2.2(b) and 2.2(c), under the same number of active
phases, the output voltage ripples are also different if the sequences of activation pattern
are different.
In a multi-phase SC voltage converter, the output voltage ripple is extremely sensitive
to the flying capacitance in each sub-phase [3]. Since the flying capacitor in each subphase is identically designed, the physical randomness of the flying capacitor induced by
the fabrication process enables the multi-phase SC converter to be eligible for building PUF
architectures.
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(a)

(b)

(c)

Fig. 2.2: Output voltage ripples of a 2:1 32-phase SC converter. a Case 1: Sequence of
activation pattern (8 active phases): (7, 12, 13, 18, 20, 25, 27, 31). b Case 2: Sequence of
activation pattern (16 active phases): (1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 14, 15, 16, 22, 23, 26, 28, 29, 30).
c Case 3: Sequence of activation pattern (16 active phases): (2, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 14, 16, 19,
23, 24, 26, 28, 29, 30, 32)

2.3 ARCHITECTURE DESIGN

The architecture of a workload-aware multi-phase voltage regulator (WAMPVR)-based
strong PUF primitive is devised in Fig. 2.2. Two identically designed 32-phase switchedcapacitor (SC) voltage converters: Block1 and Block2 are utilized to build the strong PUF
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architecture. The output port of the j th (j = 1, 2, · · · , 32) phase of the SC converter in
Blocki (i = 1, 2) connects with the switch Wi,j . Moreover, a 32-bit phase number generator
(PNG) is utilized to control the activation behaviors of the switches Wi,1 , Wi,2 , · · · , Wi,32
to determine the sequences of active phases that are used for building the strong PUF.
For example, if only the switches Wi,2 , Wi,5 , Wi,12 , and Wi,18 are turned on by the PNG,
the output voltage ripples of phase #2, phase #5, phase #12, and phase #18 of the SC
converters are selected for generating the PUF response. Since a 32-bit PNG can generate
32
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+

32
2



+···+

32
32



= 232 different activation patterns, therefore, the total number

of raw challenge-to-response pairs (CRPs) of the WAMPVR-based strong PUF primitive
are 232 .
As shown in Fig. 2.3, the mismatches of voltage ripple between Vout,1 and Vout,2 are magnified through employing an operational amplifier. Four pipelined SC circuits (SC circuit #1,
· · · , and SC circuit #4, as shown in Fig. 2.3) are utilized to convert the high-frequency
voltage ripple mismatch Va into the critical voltage Va,1 for generating the secret authentication data B. Furthermore, each SC circuit has four independent working phases: charging
phase, charge-sharing phase, output phase, and discharging phase. For example, as shown
in Fig. 2.3, if SC circuit #1 is in charging phase, the switch S1,1 will be turned on. Then
the positive component of Va will charge the capacitor C1,2 while the negative component
of Va will charge the capacitor C1,1 . Once the charging phase ends, the switch S1,1 will be
turned off while the switch S1,2 will be activated to balance the charge of the capacitors
C1,1 and C1,2 . After the charge-sharing phase, the SC circuit #1 will output the sampled
critical voltage Va,1 to generate the binary authentication data B by activating the switch
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Fig. 2.3: Architecture of the WAMPVR-based strong PUF primitive (the total number X
of phases in the original WAMPVR is 64, the resistors R1,1 , R2,1 , R1,2 , · · · , and R2,32 are
designed with the same resistance R, and the capacitors C1,1 , C1,2 , C2,1 , · · · , and C4,2 are
also designed with the same capacitance C).

S1,3 . If the voltage Va,1 ≥ 0 V, the authentication data B outputs logic value “1”. Otherwise, B = 0. In the final stage (discharging phase), the residual charge in the capacitors
C1,1 and C1,2 will be cleared to initialize the next data sampling through turning on the S1,4
switches. The main intention of employing discharging phase is to break the correlation
between the current data and the history data against machine-learning attacks. Please
note that in each SC circuit, the behaviors of the switches Sh,1 , (h = 1, 2, 3, 4), Sh,2 , Sh,3 ,
and Sh,4 are mutually exclusive. Additionally, as shown in Fig. 2.3, there are two different
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kinds of diodes: back-biased diode Dh,1 and forward-biased diode Dh,2 exist in each SC
circuit. The main role of these diodes is working as a non-linear transformation block to
generate the non-linear output response B against machine-learning attacks, which will be
fully discussed in Section 2.4.

2.4 EVALUATION

2.4.1 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

Two most significant metrics that are selected to evaluate the PUF characterization
are the inter-Hamming distance (HD) and the intra-HD (reliability) [53, 51, 54]. Inter-HD
measures the distinctness between two different PUF devices while intra-HD (reliability)
represents the stability of a single PUF device under different temperatures and supply
voltages.
In Fig. 2.3, assume the resistors R1,1 , R2,1 , R1,2 , · · · , and R2,32 are designed with a
high resistance R to reduce the overall power consumption of the WAMPVR-based strong
PUF primitive. As a result, under the same process variation, the mismatch rate of these
resistors R1,1 , · · · , and R2,32 will be negligible as compared to the mismatch rate of the
flying capacitors in the SC converters. Hence, in Fig. 2.3, the output voltage Vout,i,j of the
j th (j = 1, 2, · · · , 32) phase of the SC converter in Blocki , (i = 1, 2) can be denoted by a
function F , as shown below

Vout,i,j



TS
s
= F Ci,j , Vdd , TC , t + (j − 1)
32

(2.1)

where Cs is the flying capacitance of the j th phase of the SC converter in Blocki . Vdd , TC , TS ,
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and t, respectively, are the supply voltage, the environmental temperature, the switching
period of the SC converters, and the timing of the 1st phase of the SC converters. Let us
assume the supply voltage Vdd and the environmental temperature TC are time invariant.
As a result, the critical parameters: CS , Vdd , TC , and t are mutually independent. Then the
output voltage Vout,i,j can be approximated as2

Vout,i,j



Ts
s
= F Ci,j , Vdd , Tc , t + (j − 1)
32
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ponents of Vout,i,j that are determined by Ci,j
i1 =0 ai1 (Ci,j ) ,
Pm2

i2
i2 =0 bi2 (Vdd ) ,

and

Pm3

i3
i3 =0 ci3 (TC )


S
are the approximated polynomial expansions of F1 Ci,j
,

F2 (Vdd ), and F3 (TC ), respectively. ai1 (i1 = 0, 1, · · · , m1 ), bi2 (i2 = 0, 1, · · · , m2 ), and
ci3 (i3 = 0, 1, · · · , m3 ), respectively, are the coefficients of (Ci,j )i1 , (Vdd )i2 , and (TC )i3 . m1 ,
S
m2 , and m3 are the degrees of the approximated polynomials of F1 (Ci,j
), F2 (Vdd ), and

F3 (TC ) respectively. d0 , d1 , · · · , .m4 , e1 , e2 , · · · , em4 (m4 ) are the coefficients (degree) of the
2

As demonstrated in Fig. 2.2, the output voltage of an SC converter is a periodical signal. Therefore,
the voltage component of Vout,i,j related with the timing t can be unfolded with Fourier series.
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approximated Fourier series of F4 t + (j − 1) T32s . If the supply voltage Vdd , the environmental temperature TC , and hte timing t are fixed, through matching the relationship curve
s
between the capacitance Ci,j
and the output voltage Vout,i,j , the coefficients a0 , a1 , · · · , and
S
the degree m1 for F1 (Ci,j
) can be unriddled. The coefficients and the degrees of F2 (Vdd ),


F3 (TC ), and F4 t + (j − 1) T32s can also be estimated in a similar way.
Once the complete expression of the output voltage Vout,i,j is obtained, the following step
is to model the mismatches of output voltage ripple between Block1 and Block2 in Fig. 2.3.
Assume the 32-bit PNG in Fig. 2.3 generates the 32-bit binary data W = (w1 , w2 , · · · , w32 )2
to select a certain number of active phases of the SC converters for building a strong PUF for
authentication by controlling the activation patterns of the corresponding switches.3 As a
result, by using the Kirchhoff’s law, the voltages Vout,1 and Vout,2 in Fig. 2.3 can, respectively,
be derived as

Vout,1 =
=

P32

wj Vout,i,j
R
× P32
R
j=1 wj

P32

wj Vout,i,j

j=1

j=1

P32

j=1

P32
Vout,1 =

j=1

P32
=

(2.3)

wj

wj Vout,2,j
R
× P32
R
j=1 wj

j=1 wj Vout,2,j
P32
j=1 wj

(2.4)

3
w1 , w2 , · · · , w32 control the activation behaviors of the switches W1 , W2 , · · · , W32 respectively. If wj = 1,
the switches W1,j and W2,j are turned on, and vice versa.
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Then the voltage ripple mismatch Va in Fig. 2.3 is

P32
Va = Av (Vout,2 − Vout,1 ) = AV

j=1

wj (Vout,2,j − Vout,1,j )
P32
j=1 wj

(2.5)

For the WAMPVR-based strong PUF primitive in Fig. 2.3, assume the switching period
of the SC circuits is designed equal to four times of the switching period of the SC converters
and the pulse width of all the switches S1,1 , S1,2 , · · · , S4,4 in SC circuits is 25%. If SCcircuit1
is in charging phase, the switch S1,1 is in on-state. The voltages Va∗ and Va∗∗ of the capacitors
C1,1 and C1,2 in Fig. 2.3, respectively, are

Va∗ =

Va∗ =




 Va − Vb

, Va ≥ Vb





, Va < Vb ,

0

(2.6)




 Va + Vb

, Va ≤ Vb





, Va > Vb ,

0

(2.7)

where Vb is the forward-biased threshold voltage of the diodes D1,1 and D1,2 in Fig. 2.3.
When SCcircuit 1 enters into output phase, since the capacitors C1,1 and C1,2 are designed
with the same capacitance C, the critical voltage Vc,1 in Fig. 2.3 can be denoted as

R t+Ts
∗∗
dVa∗
C
dt
+
C1,2 dVdta dt
1,1
dt
t
t
=
C1,1 + C1,2
R t+Ts  dVa∗ dVa∗∗ 
+ dt dt
dt
t
=
2
R t+Ts

Va,1

(2.8)

Therefore, if the critical voltage Va,1 ≥ 0 V, the output binary data B = 1. Otherwise,
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B = 0.
Assume N number of WAMPVRs are utilized for building a strong PUF primitive to
generate the N -bit binary authentication data B̄. As a result, if K strong PUF primitives
are selected for evaluating the uniqueness, the inter-HD E is written as [55]

K−1
K
X X
2
B̄k1 ⊕ B̄k2
× 100%
E=
K (K − 1) k =1 k =k +1
N
1

2

(2.9)

1

where B̄k1 (k1 = 1, 2, · · · , K − 1) and B̄k2 (k2 = k1 + 1, k1 + 2, · · · , K), respectively, are the
N -bit binary authentication data generated by the k1th and k2th strong PUF primitives.
Similarly, for a single PUF primitive, if M number of different environmental settings
are considered, the reliability of the strong PUF primitive G can be expressed as [55]

G=

M
1 X B̄0∗ ⊕ B̄l∗
1−
M l=1
N

!
(2.10)

where B̄0∗ and B̄l∗ are the N -bit binary authentication data generated by the single PUF
primitive under the ideal and lth (l = 1, 2, · · · , M ) environmental setting, respectively.
All of the aforementioned parameters in the mathematical model of the designed WAMPVRbased strong PUF primitive are extracted from the 130 nm CMOS technology kits in Cadence. As shown in Fig. 2.4, by applying the Monte Carlo simulation into the aforementioned mathematical model, the inter-HD E of the WAMPVR-based strong PUF primitive
is about 51.3% (Lg = 130 nm). Furthermore, if the scaling of CMOS technology is considered, through utilizing the mismatch rates of capacitors under different CMOS technologies
from [17], the inter-HD E of the technology-scaled WAMPVR-based strong PUF primitive
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(a)

(b)

Fig. 2.4: Performance evaluation for the designed strong PUF primitive. (a) Inter-HD E
versus gate length Lg (K = 100 and N = 32). (b) Reliability G versus supply voltage Vdd
and environmental temperature Tc (M = 50 and N = 32).

can also be predicted. Related experiment results are as shown in Fig. 2.4(a). When the
CMOS technology is scaled from 130 nm to 14 nm, the inter-HD, E is improved from 51.3%
to 50.1%. That indicates a larger capacitance mismatch rate induced by a shorter gate
length enables the WAMPVR-based strong PUF primitive to achieve a better uniqueness.
Additionally, the reliability G of the designed WAMPVR-based strong PUF primitive is
assessed in Fig. 2.4(b). Concluded from results above, the ideal environmental setting for
the strong PUF primitive is: the ambient temperature Tc = 27. As shown in Fig. 2.4(b),
the worst reliability of the designed WAMPVR-based strong PUF primitive is 98.5% when
Vdd = 2.9 V.

Absolute value of correlation coefficient: r
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Fig. 2.5: Absolute value r of correlation coefficient between Pin and ∆C versus phase number
X against side-channel attacks.

2.4.2 SECURITY AGAINST SIDE-CHANNEL ATTACKS

Side-Channel Leakage Analysis
If an X-phase (assume X is even) WAMPVR is utilized for devising a strong PUF
architecture, the number of phases in Block1 and Block2 in Fig. 2.3 is X/2. Since all the
phases in Block1 and Block2 are active all the time, the input power of the WAMPVR-based
strong PUF primitive is a constant within a switching period Ts regardless the variations of
process, voltage, and temperature (PVT). However, if the mismatches of the flying capacitors
in the SC converters induced by the random fabrication process are considered, the total
input power Pin of the WAMPVR-based strong PUF primitive within a switching period Ts
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can be expressed as

Pin =

X/2
2 X
X

S
2
Ci,j
fs Vdd

(2.11)

i=1 j=1

where fs is the switching frequency of the SC converters.
Since the attacker may leak the mismatches of the flying capacitors in the SC converters
through analyzing the input power Pin , the absolute value r of correlation coefficient between
S
S
is studied against side− C1,j
the input power Pin and the capacitance mismatch ∆C = C2,j

channel attacks. As shown in Fig. 2.5, the correlation coefficient between Pin and ∆C is
about 0.0037 when the phase number X = 64, which indicates a good robustness against
side-channel attacks. Moreover, if the phase number X increases, the correlation coefficient
between Pin and ∆C will be further reduced against side-channel attacks.

Implementation of Side-Channel Attacks
The main intention of implementation of implementing side-channel attacks on the
WAMPVR-based strong PUF primitive is unriddling the output response B by analyzing the critical side-channel leakage. If the input power Pin of the proposed strong PUF
device is tailored as the critical side-channel leakage, the relationship between the input
power Pin and the output response B needs to be studied when side-channel attacks are
executed. Since the random fabrication process and circuit noise conform to normal distributions [55, 56], if the variations of PVT are considered, the input power Pin can be further
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derived as

Pin =

X/2
2 X
X

S
2
Ci,j
fs Vdd

i=1 j=1

 
2 
P2 PX/2 S
−
Xµ
C
C
i=1
j=1 i,j
1


=√
exp −

2
2Xσc
2πXσc
!
1
(fs − µf )2
×√
exp −
2Xσc2
2πσf
!!2
(Vdd − µv )2
1
exp −
× √
2σv2
2π]σc

(2.12)

where µc (σc ), µf (σf ), and µv (σv ) are the means (standard deviations) of the flying capacitance, switching frequency, and supply voltage of the proposed strong PUF device,
respectively.
So as to model the relationship between the input power Pin and the output response B,
let us define a function F ∗ (Pin ) and approximate the function F ∗ (Pin ) with a polynomial
expansion F ∗∗ (Pin ) as shown below

∗

∗

F (Pin ) ≈

K
X

fk∗ × (Pin )k = F ∗∗ (Pin )

(2.13)

k=0

where K ∗ is the degree of the approximated polynomial and fk∗ is the coefficient of (Pin )k . Assume that Z is the number of input power and output response pairs: (Pin,1 , B1 ), (Pin,2 , B2 ),
· · · , and (Pin,Z , BZ ) of the proposed strong PUF primitive are selected for analysis, then
the matching error ∆L between the input power Pin and the output response B with the
polynomial expansion F ∗∗ (Pin ) can be expressed as
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Fig. 2.6: Prediction accuracy r1 of power attacks versus standard deviations δf and δv
after analyzing 1 million input power and output response pairs (The colors and contours
represent the variation values of the prediction accuracy r1 . Since the variation values of the
prediction accuracy r1 are around 0.5 and random, that reflects power attacks are unable
to leak critical information on the proposed PUF).

!2

∗

∆L =

Z
K
X
X
z=1

fk∗ × (Pin,z )k − Bz

(2.14)

k=0

By minimizing the matching error ∆L with

∗

∂∆L
=
∂fk∗

2

k
X X

∗

!!
fk∗

k

× (Pin,z ) − Bz

k=0

×

K
X

(Pin,z )k = 0,

(2.15)

k=0

the optimal K ∗ , f0∗ , f1∗ , · · · , fK∗ ∗ can be determined.
The Z number of input power and output response pairs: (Pin,1 , B1 ), (Pin,2 , B2 ), · · · , and
(Pin,z , Bz ) of the WAMPVR-based strong PUF primitive with the 130 nm CMOS technology
under the standard deviations σf and σv is simulated in Cadence. As shown in Fig. 2.6, if
power attacks are implemented on the WAMPVR-based strong PUF primitive by exploring
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(a)

(b)

Fig. 2.7: (a) Critical voltage Va,1 versus average capacitance mismatch Q against ML attacks.
(b) Number of diodes P between the switch Sh,1 and the capacitor Ch,x in Fig. 2.3 versus
degree g of the non-linearity of the WAMPVR-based strong PUF primitive.

the input power Pin as the critical side-channel leakage, the maximum prediction accuracy of
the power attacks is about 0.52 even if 1 million input power and output response pairs are
analyzed. That indicates the proposed strong PUF primitive is adequately secure against
the advanced power attacks.

2.4.3 SECURITY AGAINST MACHINE-LEARNING (ML) ATTACKS

Non-Linearity Analysis
The degree of the non-linearity between the input challenges and the output response
is a critical parameter that affects the robustness of a strong PUF against machine-learning
(ML) attacks [57]. For the WAMPVR-based strong PUF primitive in Fig. 2.3, the relationship between the average capacitance mismatch Q and the critical voltage Va,1 is studied.
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The definition of the average capacitance mismatch Q in Fig. 2.3 is

Q=

32
X

S
S
wj C2,j
− C1,j



(2.16)

j=1

The non-linear relationship between Q and Va,1 can be observed in Fig. 2.7(a) when the
non-linear transformation block that is consist of diodes D1,1 , D1,2 , D2,1 , · · · , D4,2 (as shown
in Fig. 2.3) is enabled. By contrast, a strong linear relationship exists between Q and Va,1
if the non-linear transformation block is removed.
If Y number of different Q values: Q1 , Q2 , · · · , QY are studied, assume the corresponding
value of the critical voltage Va,1 is: Va,1,1 , Va,2,1 , · · · , Va,2,Y

0
0
0
Va,1,1
, Va,2,1
, · · · , Va,2,Y



for the

strong PUF with (without) the non-linear transformation block. As a result, the degree g of
the non-linearity of the designed WAMPVR-based strong PUF primitive can be estimated
as [58]

g=

1
2Y

PY

0
j1 =1 Va,1,j1 − Va,1,j1
 PY

2
0
j1 =1

Va,1,j

2
× 100%

(2.17)

1

Y

To enhance the degree of the non-linearity of the proposed strong PUF device, we can
increase the number of diodes in the non-linear transformation block. For instance, in
Fig. 2.3, only one diode Dh,x (h = 1, 2, 3, 4 and x = 1, 2) exists between the switch Sh,1
and the capacitor Ch,x . If larger number of diodes can be inserted, the degree g of the
non-linearity of the WAMPVR-based strong PUF primitive will be improved (g = 91.79%
when p = 5), as shown in Fig. 2.7(b).

33
Linear Regression (LR) Attacks
Linear regression (LR) algorithm [58, 59] is a kind of popular machine-learning (ML)
algorithms that can be explored to uncover the confidential information of a strong PUF
device. For the WAMPVR-based strong PUF primitive as shown in Fig.2.3, there is a
32-bit phase number generator (PNG) W = (w1 , w2 , · · · , w32 )2 that is working as the input
challenge. Accordingly, the main intention of performing ML attacks on the proposed strong
PUF primitive is estimating the relationship between the input challenge W and the output
response B. When the LR algorithm is considered for training the challenge-to-response
pairs (CRPs), the predicted output response B∗ of the proposed strong PUF device under
the input challenge W can be written as

B∗ =

32
X

Wj θj + θ0

(2.18)

j=1

where θ0 , θ1 , · · · , θ32 are linear coefficients of the LR algorithm.
If n number of CRPs: (W1 , B1 ), (W2 , B2 ), · · · , and (Wn , Bn ) are selected as the training
data sets, by considering the lease squares fit rule, the cost function S(θ) of the LR algorithm
can be obtained as

n
32
1 X X
wj,j1 θj + θ0 − Bj1
S(θ) =
2n j =1 j=1

!2
(2.19)

1

where wj,j1 is the j th bit of the j1th input challenge Wj1 . After repeating the gradient descent
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Fig. 2.8: Cost function value S(θ) and prediction accuracy r2 versus number of training
CRPs n for the WAMPVR-based strong PUF primitive under LR attacks (number of diodes
P = 3).

algorithm as shown below

∂S(θ)
∂θj

!2  32
n
32
X
X
X
1
= θj − β 
wj,j1 θj + θ0 − Bj1 
wj,j1
n j =1 j=1
j=1

θj := θj − β

(2.20)

1

where β is the learning coefficient of the LR algorithm, the critical parameters: θ0 , θ1 , · · · , θ32
can be estimated.
Fig. 2.8 shows the variations of the cost function value S(θ) and prediction accuracy
r2 of the LR algorithm is below 0.53 after enabling 100, 000 number of CRPs, as shown in
Fig. 2.8. Consequently, the proposed strong PUF primitive is sufficiently robust against ML
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(a)

(b)

Fig. 2.9: Simulated waveforms of the WAMPVR-based strong PUF primitive (X = 32). (a)
Voltages Vout,1 and Vout,2 versus time. (b) Voltage Vout,1 and binary authentication data B
versus time.

attacks.

2.5 CIRCUIT LEVEL SIMULATION

A WAMPVR-based strong PUF architecture is designed and simulated. The waveforms
of the voltages Vout,1 and Vout,2 in Fig. 2.3 that contain the voltage ripple information are
shown in Fig. 2.9(a). By using Monte Carlo simulation, the mismatches of voltage ripple of
Block1 and Block2 in Fig. 2.3 induced by the random mismatches of the flying capacitors
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in the SC converters can be observed in Fig. 2.9(a) obviously. Additionally, as shown in
Fig. 2.9(b), if the voltage Va (as shown in Fig. 2.3) outputs logic value “0”. Moreover, the
non-linear effect induced by the diodes can also be observed in Fig. 2.9(b) if the voltage Va
exhibits a small negative amplitude.

2.6 CONCLUSION

A novel strong PUF architecture is designed based on the on-chip workload-aware multiphase voltage regulators (WAMPVRs).Through exploiting the physical randomness of the
flying capacitors in the multi-phase switched-capacitor (SC) voltage converter, the strong
PUF primitive we designed achieves a nearly 51.3% inter-HD and 98.5% reliability. Furthermore, in the WAMPVR-based strong PUF architecture we proposed, an approximated
constant input power is achieved against side-channel attacks while a non-linear transformation block is utilized to add non-linearity against machine-learning attacks. As demonstrated
in the results, for the designed strong PUF primitive, after enabling 1 × 106 (1 × 105 ) items
of data to execute power (machine-learning) attacks, the prediction accuracy is about 0.52
(0.53). By contrast, the prediction accuracy is about 0.98 (0.999) when power (machinelearning) attacks are performed on the conventional PUF design under the assistance of
26 × 103 (39.2 × 103 ) items of data.
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CHAPTER 3

USING BALANCED LOGIC GATES TO DESIGN AN
INNOVATE STRONG PUF IN IOT SECURITY

3.1 MOTIVATION

A PUF primitive is designed on a power delivery system as a countermeasure to both
machine learning attacks and side-channel attacks1 . The advantage of the proposed CoRe
PUF design is that by attaching additional collection devices of logical signal, the complexity of remodeling is greatly reduced. Besides, since the PUF is redesigned on an existing
functional device, the overhead is greatly reduced. Comparing to former PUF designs, the
proposed CoRe PUF gives consideration to features of both security and system function.
However, the drawback of the proposed PUF design is still obvious. The PUF primitive,
after all, needs to gain particular input binary sequence whenever the CRP is recorded or
validated. In any case above, the PRNG in the CoRe PUF need to provide particular control
signal. When that happens, the power supply must be cut off in order to realize the authentication of PUFs. Another potential vulnerability is that the defensing to machine learning
attacks and side-channel attacks is “ nonsynchronous”. If attackers are able to acquire
the PUF behavior with hardware Trojan or other approaches, they can easily categorize
collected signal and choose to crack PUF and PRNG one by one. In this section, a new
PUF primitive, WDDL-based AES strong PUF, is introduced to mitigate aforementioned
1

The content of this Chapter partially has been published in [60].
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vulnerabilities. Similar to the CoRe PUF, the WDDL-AES PUF is also redesigned on a
functional device which eliminate the overhead when introducing a non-functioning part.
Comparing to the CoRe PUF in Chapter 2, the new technique can introduce more entropy
of input signals against side-channel attacks. And a non-linear function is also added to
enhance the non-linearity of internal logic, which aims to reduce the linear correlation of
CRPs and vulnerabilities to machine learning attacks.

3.2 ARCHITECTURE DESIGN

The internal architecture of a WDDL-based AES strong PUF primitive is shown in
Fig. 3.1. The 128-bit AES2 cryptographic circuit has 16 number of S-boxes in each encryption round. Since all the S-boxes are fully implemented with WDDL gates, the dynamic
power dissipation of each S-box within a clock period is the same under any input data
regardless of PVT variations. In the WDDL-based AES strong PUF primitive, 16 number of S-boxes are uniformly divided into four groups: group1 , group2 , group3 , and group4 .
As shown in Fig. 3.1, the power supply ports of S-box4(i−1)+1 , (i = 1, 2, 3, 4), S-box4(i−1)+2 ,
S-box4(i−1)+3 , and S-box4(i−1)+4 are connected with the line Wi . The 32-bit binary input
data A = (a1 , a2 , ..., a32 )2 is utilized for generating different dynamic power signatures for
the corresponding groups, as shown in Fig. 3.1. A tiny resistor Rin,i is inserted between the
supply voltage source Vdd and the line Wi for sensing the current fluctuations induced by the
load capacitance mismatches in the WDDL-based S-boxes under different input data. If the
resistors Rin,1 , Rin,2 , Rin,3 , and Rin,4 in Fig. 3.1 are designed with the same resistance, the
2

The number of CRPs can be further increased if a 196-bit AES or 256-bit AES is utilized for building
the WDDL-based AES strong PUF.
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Fig. 3.1: Architecture of a WDDL-based AES strong PUF primitive (the total number N
of digital input bits of the AES cryptographic circuit is 128).

differences among the electric potentials3 V1 (t), V2 (t), V3 (t), and V4 (t) reflect the internal
load capacitance mismatches among group1 , group2 , group3 , and group4 . In Fig. 3.1, one
operational amplifier OA1 is selected for magnifying the difference between V1 (t) and V2 (t)
to generate the critical voltage Vx,1 (t) while the other operational amplifier OA2 is utilized
to amplify the difference between V3 (t) and V4 (t) for outputting the critical voltage Vx,2 (t).
Moreover, as shown in Fig. 3.1, a non-linear product function is applied on the voltages
Vx,1 (t) and Vx,2 (t) to generate another critical voltage Vc (t) that can be used for achieving
the high non-linear output responses against machine-learning attacks.
3

Vi (t) is the electric potential of the line Wi where t is the timing, as shown in Fig. 3.1
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Fig. 3.2: Waveform of control signal of the switch Si1 ,j (CLK is the clock signal of the input
data A. Si1 ,j = 1 represents the switch Si1 ,j is in on-state, and vice versa).

Once the critical voltage Vc (t) is obtained, the following step is converting the analog
voltage Vc (t) into the digital confidential data B for authentication. As shown in Fig. 3.1,
three flying capacitors C1 , C2 , and C3 are utilized for sampling the DC component of Vc (t)
within each clock period. The waveform of control signal of the switch Si1 ,j , (i1 , j = 1, 2, 3) is
shown in Fig. 3.2. The switched-capacitor circuit in Fig. 3.1 has three basic working phases:
charging phase, output phase, and discharging phase. For instance, if the flying capacitor
C1 is in charging phase, the switch S1,1 is in on-state while the switches S1,2 and S1,3 are in
off-state, as shown in Fig. 3.2. Consequently, the flying capacitor C1 will have been charged
by the critical voltage Vc (t) for a clock period. However, when the charging phase ends, the
flying capacitor C1 will be switched to output phase. The switch S1,2 will be activated to
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output the DC component Vc,1 of Vc (t) within a clock period to generate the binary secret
data B by using a hysteresis comparator. If Vc,1 ≥ Vref = 0 V, the output binary data
B = 1. Otherwise, B = 0. After the output phase, the flying capacitor C1 will enter into
the last working phase: discharging phase. The DC voltage Vc,1 of the flying capacitor C1
is discharged to 0 V to initialize the next sampling behavior by activating the switch S1,3 .
Please kindly note that only one of the switches (S1,1 , S1,2 , and S1,3 ) is active under any
timing, as shown in Fig. 3.2.
For the switched-capacitor circuit in Fig. 3.1, the behaviors of the flying capacitors C1 ,
C2 , and C3 are mutually exclusive. For instance, when the flying capacitor C1 is in charging
phase, the flying capacitors C2 and C3 are in output phase and discharging phase, respectively, as shown in Fig. 3.2. Therefore, the critical analog voltage Vc (t) can be continuously
converted into the digital binary data B through utilizing the switched-capacitor circuit.

3.3 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

In the designed WDDL-based AES strong PUF as shown in Fig. 3.1, the transient
power consumption Pk (A∗k , t) and current Ik (A∗k , t) of the kth, (k = 1, 2, ..., 16) WDDLimplemented S-box (S-boxk ) within a clock period of group1 , respectively, can be denoted
as

Pk (A∗k , t)

=

fc V12 (t)

Ik (A∗k , t) = fc V1 (t)

α
X

ω=1
α
X

Cω,k (A∗k , t),

Cω,k (A∗k , t)

(3.1)
(3.2)

ω=1

where fc is the clock frequency of the input data and A∗k is the 8-bit input data of S-boxk
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that is written as A∗k = (a8(k−1)+1 , ..., a8k )2 and A∗l+4g = A∗l , (l = 1, 2, 3, 4 and g = 0, 1, 2, 3),
as shown in Fig. 3.1. α is the total number of 0 → 1 transitions happened in the S-boxk
under the input data A∗k while Cω,k (A∗k , t) is the load capacitance of the ωth, (ω = 1, 2, ..., α)
WDDL gate in S-boxk that is related with the ωth 0 → 1 transition under the input data
A∗k at the timing t. Since the clock frequency fc has an approximated linear relationship
with the environmental temperature Te and the supply voltage Vdd , respectively, the clock
frequency fc can be approximated as [61]

fc ≈

fc,0 (a0 + a1 Te )(b0 + b1 Vdd )
(a0 + a1 Te,0 )(b0 + b1 Vdd,0 )

(3.3)

where fc,0 is the clock frequency under the ideal environmental temperature Te,0 and supply
voltage Vdd,0 . a0 and a1 (b0 and b1 ) are the coefficients of linear approximation of the
environmental temperature Te (supply voltage Vdd ).
By utilizing the equation V1 (t) = Vdd − Rin,1

P4

∗
k=1 Ik (Ak , t)

that is derived from Fig. 3.1,

the supply voltage V1 (t) of group1 is approximated as

Vdd

V1 (t) ≈
1+

P4

k=1

Pα

∗
ω=1 fc,0 (a0 +a1 Te )(b0 +b1 Vdd )Cω,k (Ak ,t)Rin,1
(a0 +a1 Te,0 )(b0 +b1 Vdd,0 )

.

(3.4)

Similarly, the supply voltages of the rest groups: V2 (t), V3 (t), and V4 (t) can also be determined by following the aforementioned steps.
Once V1 (t), V2 (t), V3 (t), and V4 (t) are obtained, the critical voltages Vx,1 (t) and Vx,2 (t)
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in Fig. 3.1, respectively, can be determined as

V2 (t) + V1 (t)
,
2
V3 (t) + V4 (t)
Vx,2 (t) = Av,2 (V4 (t) − V3 (t)) + Ac,2
2
Vx,1 (t) = Av,1 (V2 (t) − V1 (t)) + Ac,1

(3.5)
(3.6)

where Av,1 (Av,2 ) and Ac,1 (Ac,2 ) are the differential gain and the common-mode gain of the
operational amplifier OA1 (OA2 ), respectively. In Fig. 3.1, if the switching period of the
switches S1,1 , ..., S3,3 is designed three times of the clock period of the input data A, the
DC component Vc,1 of the critical voltage Vc (t) within a clock period can be derived as

Z

(n+1)Tc

Z

(n+1)Tc

Vx,1 (t)Vx,2 (t)dt

Vc (t)dt =

Vc,1 =
nTc

(3.7)

nTc

where Tc is the clock period and n, (n = 0, 1, 2, ...) represents the number of the clock period.
If Vc,1 ≥ Vref = 0 V, the output binary data B = 1. Otherwise, B = 0.
In order to model the relationship between the input challenge A and the output response
B for the proposed WDDL-based AES strong PUF, the next step that needs to be finished
is to determine the function Cω,k (A∗k , t). So as to do the analysis in a more efficient way, let
us write Cω,k (A∗k , t) as

∗
∗∗
Cω,k (A∗k , t) = Cω,k
(A∗k )Cω,k
(t)

(3.8)

∗
where Cω,k
(A∗k ) is the component of the ω th load capacitance in S-boxk that is determined
∗∗
by the input data A∗k while Cω,k
(t) is the component of the ω th load capacitance in S-boxk
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∗∗
determined by the timing t. Cω,k
(t) can be denoted as

∗∗
Cω,k
(t) =





1 , t = tω + nTc

(3.9)




0 , Otherwise

where tω represents the activation timing within the 1st clock period for the ωth load
∗∗
(t) is a
capacitor that is related with the ωth 0 → 1 transition. Since (3.9) indicates Cω,k
∗∗
period signal, Cω,k
(t) can be approximately unfolded with Fourier series as shown below

n

∗∗
Cω,k
(t)

1
c0,ω X
2πh
2πh
≈
+
(ch,ω cos
t + dh,ω sin
t)
2
Tc
Tc
h=1

(3.10)

where c0,ω , c1,ω , ..., cn1 ,ω , d1,ω , ..., dn1 ,ω (n1 ) are the coefficients (degree) of the approximated
∗∗
Fourier series of Cω,k
(t).If we discretize the time region [nTc , (n + 1)Tc ) with n2 number of

timing points, the values of timing t are nTc , (n + n12 )Tc , (n + n22 )Tc , · · · , (n + n2n−1
)Tc . For a
2
WDDL-based S-box, the total load capacitance is a constant α within a clock period under
different input data. As a result, we can obtain c0,ω = 2α/n2 with

Z

(n+1)Tc

(
nTc

α
X

∗∗
Cω,k
(t))dt

Z

(n+1)Tc

≈
nTc

ω=1

Z

(n+1)Tc

=
nTc

n

1
2πh
2πh
c0,ω X
+
(ch,ω cos
t + dh,ω sin
t))dt
(
2
T
T
c
c
h=1

c0,ω
c0,ω
Tc
dt =
Tc = α .
2
2
n2

(3.11)

When the coefficient c0,ω is obtained, the values of the rest parameters can also be
estimated. Before determining the values of the rest parameters, two n1 -dimension vectors
Cω = [c1,ω , ..., cn1 ,ω ] and Dω = [d1,ω , ..., dn1 ,ω ] need to be defined, and two n1 × n2 matrices
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M1 and M2 can be, respectively, set as . . .



 cos(2πn)


 cos(4πn)

M1 = 

..

.



cos(2n1 πn)

···

cos(2π(n +

n2 −1
))
n2





· · · cos(4π(n + n2n−1
))

2
,

.
..

..
.



n2 −1
· · · cos(2n1 π(n + n2 ))

(3.12)




 sin(2πn)


 sin(4πn)

M2 = 

..

.



sin(2n1 πn)

···

sin(2π(n +

n2 −1
))
n2





· · · sin(4π(n + n2n−1
))

2
.

..
...

.



))
· · · sin(2n1 π(n + n2n−1
2

(3.13)

By utilizing (3.9), (3.10), (3.12), and (3.13), we can acquire

C (0) + M1T CωT + M2T DωT = Cω∗∗∗

(3.14)

∗∗
∗∗
where the two n2 ×1 matrices C (0) and Cω∗∗∗ are [2α/n2 , 2α/n2 , ..., 2α/n2 ]T and [Cω,k
(nTc ), Cω,k
((n+
1
∗∗
)Tc ), ..., Cω,k
((n
n2

+

n2 −1
)Tc )]T ,
n2

respectively. If n1 is set as n2 /2, by solving (3.14), the rest

coefficients: c1,ω , ..., cn1 ,ω , d1,ω , ..., dn1 ,ω can be determined.
Eventually, assume the capacitance mismatch of a WDDL gate induced by the process
variations is β. If a Monte Carlo simulation is selected to evaluate the performance of
∗
the WDDL-based AES strong PUF, the capacitance function Cω,k
(A∗k ) will approximately

conform to a normal distribution N ∼ (C0 , ( β6 )2 ) where C0 is the identically designed load
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Fig. 3.3: Dynamic current profile of group1 (Four number of WDDL-based S-boxes are used.
A1 , A2 , and A3 are three different 32-bit binary data).

capacitance. Likewise, if the resistance (common-mode gain) mismatch of two identically
designed input resistors (operational amplifiers) impacted by the process variations is β1
(β2 ), the resistances of Rin,1 , ..., Rin,4 (common-mode gains Ac,1 and Ac,2 ) in Fig. 3.1 will
also have an approximated normal distribution N ∼ (R0 , ( β61 )2 ) (N ∼ (0, ( β62 )2 )) where R0
is the identically designed resistance for Rin,1 , ..., Rin,4 under the Monte Carlo simulation.
Therefore, if K number of WDDL-based AES strong PUFs are utilized to generate the
K-bit output response B and M number of K-bit WDDL-based AES strong PUFs are used
to generate the challenge-to-response pairs (CRPs), the inter-hamming distance (HD) H of
the WDDL-based AES strong PUF can be determined by using the aforementioned model.
Similarly, if a single WDDL-based AES strong PUF is assessed under different environmental
temperatures and supply voltages, the reliability G of the WDDL-based AES strong PUF
can also be estimated by considering the environmental temperature Te and the supply
voltage Vdd with normal distributions.
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(a)

(b)

Fig. 3.4: Performance evaluation for the WDDL-based AES strong PUF. (a) Inter-HD H
versus identically designed resistance R0 (M = 100 and K = 10). (b) Reliability G versus
supply voltage Vdd and environmental temperature Te (M = 50 and K = 10).

A 128-bit AES cryptographic circuit is designed and simulated in Cadence with the 130
nm CMOS technology kits. As shown in Fig. 3.3, when the input data A = (a1 , a2 , ..., a32 )2
make transitions from A1 to A2 and from A2 to A3 , group1 in Fig. 3.1 exhibits a constant
dynamic current if a standard simulation4 is enabled. That indicates the WDDL-based Sbox has a constant dynamic power consumption under different input data regardless of the
variations of PVT. However, if a Monte Carlo simulation5 is performed, the dynamic current
signature of the WDDL-based S-box varies when the input data change. The simulation
results demonstrate that the random load capacitance mismatches in WDDL gates can
achieve different dynamic current signatures for authentication.
By combining the values of the critical parameters that are extracted from the 130
nm CMOS technology node in Cadence with the aforementioned mathematical model, the
4

Standard simulation means the simulation neglects the variations of process, voltage, and temperature
(PVT).
5
Monte Carlo simulation represents the variations of process are included in the simulation.
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performance of the proposed WDDL-based AES strong PUF can be assessed. As shown in
Fig. 3.4(a), the inter-HD H of the WDDL-AES strong PUF approaches the ideal value 50%
when the identically designed resistance R0 increases from 1 Ω to 10 Ω. That indicates a
higher R0 enables the WDDL-based AES strong PUF to achieve a better uniqueness due to
a larger variance of physical randomness. In addition, the reliability G of the WDDL-based
AES strong PUF is shown in Fig. 3.4(b). The worst reliability G is about 97.7% (Vdd =1.0
V and Te =27 ◦ C) when the ideal environmental setting is: the supply voltage Vdd,0 =1.2 V
and the environmental temperature Te,0 =27 ◦ C.
As shown in Fig. 3.1, the proposed WDDL-based AES strong PUF contains 32 input
challenge bits: a1 , a2 , ..., a32 and 1 output response bit: B. When the strong PUF chip is
utilized for authentication, 1000 random input challenges out of the 232 total possible input
challenges can be selected for generating 1000 output response bits. Under the 1000 given
input challenges, if the attacker predicts the 1000 output response bits with a 0.5 random
guess probability, only about 500 output response bits may be matched. In contrast, when
the host predicts the 1000 output response bits under the assistance of the stored CRPs,
over 970 output response bits can be matched since the worst reliability of the proposed
strong PUF is over 97% (as shown in Fig. 3.4(b)).
For the proposed WDDL-based AES strong PUF, its uniqueness is closed to the ideal
value (50%) as shown in Fig. 3.4(a). Under such a condition, if 1000 stochastic input
challenges are used for creating 1000 output response bits to achieve authentication, the
probability of obtaining the same 1000 output response bits for two different strong PUF
chips is around 1/21000 . This indicates it is impossible to receive the same 1000 output
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(a)

(b)

Fig. 3.5: Two logic gates share the same power supply. (a) Regular logic gates. (b) WDDL
gates.

response bits in practice even if millions of chips are manufactured.
Aging issues are inevitable for hardware security primitives like silicon PUFs. Commonly, negative bias temperature instability (NBTI), hot carrier injection (HCI), and time
dependent dielectric breakdown (TDDB) [62] are the three critical mechanisms that cause
unreliable issues to silicon PUFs. However, as compared to other regular strong PUFs such
as arbiter PUFs, the proposed strong PUF is more robust against aging-induced reliability
issues. The plausible explanation is that the proposed strong PUF utilizes a large number of
logic gates (about 24270) to generate the random load capacitance mismatches. Hence, it is
deemed to output the reliable output response even though a small amount of capacitance
mismatch is altered by the aging issues.

3.4 ROBUSTNESS AGAINST POWER ATTACKS

To leak the critical information of the WDDL-based AES strong PUF, power attacks
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may be deployed by the attacker to estimate the relationship between the input power and
the output response of the strong PUF. Hence, so as to demonstrate the proposed PUF
is sufficiently robust against power attacks, in this Section, the input power entropy of the
proposed PUF is fully analyzed and an advanced power attack is performed on the proposed
PUF to explore the relationship between the input power and the output response.

3.4.1 INPUT POWER ENTROPY ANALYSIS

Input power entropy is a significant metric to quantify the robustness of a system against
power attacks [63, 64]. For the proposed WDDL-based AES strong PUF in Fig. 3.1, the
attacker may perform a power attack on it through monitoring and analyzing its power
trace. In order to simplify the power attack, the attacker may dynamically alter the input
data A∗k of the single S-boxk while maintaining a constant input data for the rest of the
S-boxes. As a result, only the single S-boxk exhibits the high dynamic power dissipation
that may leak the critical information to the attacker. Accordingly, for power attacks, the
security of a single WDDL-based S-box dominates the security of the WDDL-based AES
strong PUF. As shown in Fig. 3.5(a), two regular logic gates connect with the same power
source V . When the output Z1 of the regular logic gate #1 makes a transition from 0 to
1 and the output Z2 of the regular logic gate #2 is kept a constant, the transient current
I of the power source V is I = fc@ V C1@ where fc@ is the clock frequency of the logic gates
and C1@ is the load capacitance of the regular logic gate #1. Hence, C1@ can be determined
as C1@ = I/(fc@ V ) and the load capacitance C2@ of the regular logic gate #2 can also be
estimated in a similar way. That indicates the internal parameters of the regular logic gates
can be leaked to the attacker without much effort by utilizing the power analysis.
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However, for the WDDL gates in Fig. 3.5(b), the case is quite different. The four
different transient current signatures: I1∗ , I2∗ , I3∗ , and I4∗ of the power source V induced by
four different output logic transitions are summarized in Table I. By considering Fig. 3.5(b)
and Table I, the below equation (3.15) is obtained with




 1 0 1


 1 0 0
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 0 1 1
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(3.15)

@
@
@
@
are the corresponding load capacitance values in Fig. 3.5(b).
, and C2,2
, C2,1
, C1,2
where C1,1

After solving (3.15), we can obtain

@
@
C1,1
− C1,2
= I1∗ − I3∗ ,

(3.16)

@
@
C2,1
− C2,2
= I2∗ − I4∗ .

(3.17)

Therefore, even if the power analysis is performed on the WDDL gates, a large amount of
@
@
@
@
uncertainty is still existing among the internal parameters: C1,1
, C1,2
, C2,1
, and C2,2
.

In a WDDL-based S-box, assume X number of WDDL gates connect with the same
power source. As demonstrated above, by using the power analysis, the attacker can only
determine the load capacitance mismatch between the output and the complementary output
for each WDDL gate. Since the capacitance mismatch of two identically designed load
capacitors in the WDDL gates induced by the process variations is β, let us assume the
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TABLE 3.1: Four different transient current signatures: I1∗ , I2∗ , I3∗ , and I4∗ induced by four
different output logic transitions of Fig. 3.5(b).

load capacitance C ∈ [C0 − β2 , C0 + β2 ]. If N1 number of different load capacitance values
are existing in the WDDL gates, the j1 th, (j1 = 1, 2, ..., N1 ) load capacitance value Cj1 and
the corresponding probability P (Cj1 ), respectively, are

Cj1 = (C0 −

j1 − 1
β
)+
β,
2
N1 − 1
√1 β
2π 6

P (Cj1 ) ≈ PN
1

exp(−

√1
j1 =1 2π β
6

(3.18)

(Cj1 −C0 )2
2( β6 )2

exp(−

)

(Cj1 −C0 )2
2( β6 )2

.

(3.19)

)

Assume the load capacitance mismatch of the i2 th, (i2 = 1, 2, ..., X) WDDL gate in the
WDDL-based S-box is ∆Ci2 . Then the probability P ∗ (Cj1 , Cj1 + ∆Ci2 ) of the i2 th WDDL
gate with the load capacitance Cj1 of the output and the load capacitance Cj1 + ∆Ci2 of the
complementary output can be written as

∗

P (Cj1 , Cj1 + ∆Ci2 ) =





P (C )

 PN2 j1

, j1 = 1, 2, ..., N2





0

, Otherwise

j1 =1

P (Cj1 )

(3.20)
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Fig. 3.6: Loss ratio E ∗∗ of input power entropy versus number of different load capacitance
values N1 for the WDDL-based AES strong PUF against the power attack.

P 2
where N2 and P (Cj1 )/( N
j1 =1 P (Cj1 )), respectively, are

N2 = [

β − ∆Ci2
(N1 − 1)] + 1,
β

(3.21)

(Cj −C0 )2
1
)
β
2( 6 )2
(Cj −C0 )2
P N1
1
)
j1 =1 exp(−
β
2( 6 )2
(Cj −C0 )2
1
)
exp(−
β
2( 6 )2
N2

exp(−

P (Cj1 )
≈
PN2
j1 =1 P (Cj1 )
P

j1 =1 ( PN1

j1 =1

exp(−

(Cj −C0 )2
1
)
β
2( 6 )2

.

(3.22)

)

Therefore, the input power entropy E of the WDDL-based AES strong PUF after performing the power attack is estimated as

E=−

N1
X X
X

P ∗ (Cj1 ,Cj1 +∆Ci2 )

P ∗ (Cj1 , Cj1 + ∆Ci2 )log2

.

(3.23)

i2 =1 j1 =1

However, before performing the power attack on the WDDL-based AES strong PUF, the
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load capacitance Cj1 and complementary load capacitance Cj2 , (j2 = 1, 2, ..., N1 ) of the i2 th
WDDL gate in the WDDL-based S-box are independent. Hence, the original input power
entropy E ∗ of the WDDL-based AES strong PUF is

∗

E = −X

N1
N1 X
X

P (Cj1 )P (Cj2 )

P (Cj1 )P (Cj2 )log2

.

(3.24)

j2 =1 j1 =1

As a result, the loss ratio E ∗∗ of input power entropy of the WDDL-based AES strong
PUF after performing the power attack can be defined as E ∗∗ = (E/E ∗ ) × 100%. As shown
in Fig. 3.6, the maximum loss ratio of the input power entropy of the WDDL-based AES
strong PUF with the 130 nm CMOS technology node is less than 25% after executing the
power attack. Moreover, when the CMOS technology node is scaled from 130 nm to 14 nm
by using the process mismatch data from [17], the corresponding maximum loss ratio can
be reduced below 15%. Accordingly, the WDDL-based AES strong PUF exhibits a good
theoretical resilience against power attacks. However, to guarantee the WDDL-based AES
strong PUF is sufficiently robust against power attacks in practice, a state-of-the-art power
attack is studied on the proposed PUF in Section 3.4.2.

3.4.2 STATE-OF-THE-ART POWER ATTACK ON THE PROPOSED PUF

The main intention of performing power attacks on the WDDL-based AES strong PUF
is precisely predicting the output response B by measuring the corresponding input power
Pin of the PUF. If the mathematical function f (Pin ) is used to map the relationship between
the input power Pin and the output response B, under the assistance of Taylor series, the
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relationship between B and Pin can be expressed as
∞
X
di3 f (Pin )/d(Pin )i3

B = f (Pin ) =

i3 !

i3 =0

≈

m
X

(Pin )i3

λi4 (Pin )i4

(3.25)

i4 =0

where m is the approximated degree of the Taylor series and the coefficient λi4 , (i4 =
0, 1, ..., m) of (Pin )i4 is

λi4 =

di4 f (Pin )/d(Pin )i4
.
i4 !

(3.26)

Since the output response B is a binary data, two critical parameters B ∗ and B ∗∗ can
be utilized by the attacker to predict the output response B = 0 and B = 1, respectively.
The parameters B ∗ and B ∗∗ can, respectively, be defined as

∗

B =
B ∗∗ =

m1
X
i5 =0
m2
X

λ∗i5 (Pin )i5 ,

(3.27)

i6
λ∗∗
i6 (Pin )

(3.28)

i6 =0

where m1 (m2 ) is the degree of the series

Pm1

i5 =0

λ∗i5 (Pin )i5 (

Pm2

i6 =0

i6
∗
λ∗∗
i6 (Pin ) ) and λi5 , (i5 =

i5
i6
0, 1, ..., m1 ) (λ∗∗
i6 , (i6 = 0, 1, ..., m2 )) is the coefficient of (Pin ) ((Pin ) ).

Assume n3 number of input power and output response pairs (IPORP) have been gathered by the attacker to perform the power attack on the proposed PUF. Furthermore, within
the n3 number of IPORP, assume there are n4 number of IPORP with the output response
equals to 0: (Pin,1 , 0), (Pin,2 , 0), ..., (Pin,n4 , 0) and n3 − n4 number of IPORP with the
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Fig. 3.7: Prediction accuracy r of the power attack under the parameters B ∗ and B ∗∗ versus
degrees m1 and m2 of the series (n3 = 1, 000, 000).

output response equals to 1: (Pin,n4 +1 , 1), (Pin,n4 +2 , 1), ..., (Pin,n3 , 1). As a result, if the
IPORP (Pin,1 , 0), (Pin,2 , 0), ..., (Pin,n4 , 0) and (Pin,n4 +1 , 1), (Pin,n4 +2 , 1), ..., (Pin,n3 , 1) are
used for predicting the output response B = 0 and B = 1, respectively, the two critical
parameters B ∗ and B ∗∗ , respectively, are modified as

∗

B =

n4 X
m1
X

λ∗i5 (Pin,j3 )i5 ,

(3.29)

j3 =1 i5 =0

B

∗∗

=

nX
m2
3 −n4 X

i6
λ∗∗
i6 (Pin,j4 ) .

(3.30)

j4 =1 i6 =0

To maximize the prediction accuracy of the power attack on the WDDL-based AES
strong PUF, the objective function of the optimization is obtained as
nX
m2
3 −n4 X

max (B ∗∗ − B ∗ )2 = (

j4 =1 i6 =0

i6
λ∗∗
i6 (Pin,j4 ) −

n4 X
m1
X
j3 =1 i5 =0

λ∗i5 (Pin,j3 )i5 )2 .

(3.31)
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The input power values Pin,j3 , Pin,j4 ∈ [Pmin , Pmax ] where Pmin and Pmax are the minimum
power dissipation and maximum power dissipation of the WDDL-based AES strong PUF,
respectively. So as to estimate the values of the coefficients λ∗i5 and λ∗∗
i6 in (3.31), the partial
differential equations of (B ∗∗ − B ∗ )2 need be set to 0. Consequently, we can acquire


∗∗ −B ∗ )
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(3.32)

Fig. 3.7 shows the relationship between the prediction accuracy r of the power attack on
the 130 nm CMOS WDDL-based AES strong PUF and the degrees m1 and m2 of the series.
After analyzing 1 million number of IPORP, the maximum prediction accuracy r of the
power attack is still below 55%. The result reflects it is difficult for the attacker to disclose
the confidential information of the WDDL-based AES strong PUF through exploring the
power leakage of the PUF.

3.5 RESILIENCE AGAINST MACHINE-LEARNING ATTACKS

Despite the present silicon PUFs may be effective for protecting IoT against some specific malicious attacks like hardware reverse engineering attacks [65, 66], one of the most
significant security concerns of the current silicon PUFs is the resilience against machine
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learning attacks [57, 58, 67]. As far as we know, high linear relationships exist between
the input challenges and the output responses for most conventional silicon PUFs such as
ring-oscillator (RO) PUFs [4, 68], arbiter PUFs [69, 57], and clock PUFs [70], which cause
them extremely vulnerable to machine-learning attacks. For the WDDL-based AES strong
PUF, to assess the corresponding security level against machine-learning attacks, the degree
of the non-linearity of the PUF is evaluated and three different deep-learning attacks are
performed on the PUF in the following subsections.

3.5.1 ASSESSMENT OF NON-LINEARITY

When it comes to a strong PUF, the degree of the non-linearity between the input
challenge and the output response is a critical parameter to reflect the robustness of the
strong PUF against machine-learning attacks [71, 57]. Moreover, the linear matching error is
a commonly used parameter that represents the degree of the non-linearity of a system [58].
Since Cω,k (A∗k , t) represents the ωth load capacitance in S-boxk that is related with the ωth
0 → 1 transition under the input data A∗k at the timing t of the WDDL-based AES strong
PUF, the total load capacitance mismatch ∆Cω (A∗k ) between group1 and group2 in Fig. 3.1
within a clock period is

∆Cω (A∗k )

Z

(n+1)Tc

=
nTc

4
8
X
X
∗
(
Cω,k (Ak , t) −
Cω,k (A∗k , t))dt.
k=1

(3.33)

k=5

0

Similarly, the total load capacitance mismatch ∆Cω (A∗k ) between group3 and group4 in
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Fig. 3.1 within a clock period can also be obtained as

0

∆Cω (A∗k )

Z

(n+1)Tc

=
nTc

12
16
X
X
(
Cω,k (A∗k , t) −
Cω,k (A∗k , t))dt.
k=9

(3.34)

k=13

0

Assume the load capacitance mismatches ∆Cω (A∗k ) and ∆Cω (A∗k ) with a linear function
∗
as shown below to match the DC component Vc,1
are utilized to generate a parameter Vc,1

of the critical voltage Vc (t)

0

∗
Vc,1
= γ2 ∆Cω (A∗k ) + γ1 ∆Cω (A∗k ) + γ0

(3.35)

where γ2 , γ1 , and γ0 are the coefficients of the linear function. If Y number of different
input data A∗k : A∗k,1 , A∗k,2 , ..., A∗k,Y are used for evaluating the degree of the non-linearity of
the WDDL-based AES strong PUF, the normalized linear matching error ε is
0
2
∗
∗
y=1 (γ2 ∆Cω (Ak,y ) + γ1 ∆Cω (Ak,y ) + γ0 − Vc,1,y )
PY
0
(γ2 ∆Cω (A∗k,y )+γ1 ∆Cω
(A∗k,y )+γ0 )
2Y ( y=1
)2
Y

PY
ε=

(3.36)

where Vc,1,y , (y = 1, 2, ..., Y ) is the yth value of the critical voltage Vc,1 under the input data
A∗k,y . By minimizing the linear matching error ε with ∂ε/∂γz = 0, (z = 0, 1, 2), the minimal
linear matching error εmin and the coefficients: γ2 , γ1 , and γ0 can be determined.
As shown in Fig. 3.8, the minimal linear matching error εmin is about 1023% for the 130
nm CMOS WDDL-based AES strong PUF against machine-learning attacks. Additionally,
the security of the WDDL-based AES strong PUF against machine-learning attacks can be
further predicted when the CMOS technology node is scaled from 130 nm to 14 nm by using
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Fig. 3.8: Minimal linear matching error εmin versus gate length Lg for the WDDL-based
AES strong PUF against machine-learning attacks (Y = 100, 000).

the process mismatch data from [17], as illustrated in Fig. 3.8.

3.5.2 DEEP-LEARNING ATTACKS ON THE PROPOSED PUF

Artificial neural network (ANN) attacks are a kind of popular deep-learning attacks that
were chosen by prior works [58, 72, 73] to study the resilience of a PUF against machinelearning attacks. In this paper, three different ANN architectures: regular ANN, forward
ANN, and backward ANN are designed for performing deep-learning attacks on the WDDLbased AES strong PUF, as shown Fig. 3.9.
For the proposed PUF, the input challenge A = (a1 , a2 , ..., a32 )2 is a 32-bit binary data
and the output response B is a binary bit. Therefore, in the regular ANN as shown in
Fig. 3.9(a), a0 , a1 , ..., a32 are set as the input layer and B is set as the output layer to model
the relationship between the input challenge and the output response of the proposed PUF.
However, since the WDDL-based AES strong PUF exploits the characteristic of dynamic
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(a)

(b)

(c)

Fig. 3.9: Three different artificial neural network (ANN) architectures for performing deeplearning attacks on the WDDL-based AES strong PUF. (a) Regular ANN. (b) Forward
ANN. (c) Backward ANN..

power dissipation, the output data not only depend on the current input data but also are
affected by the history data [74, 75]. Thus, two more advanced ANN architectures: forward
ANN (as shown in Fig. 3.9(b)) and backward ANN (as shown in Fig. 3.9(c)) are proposed
to further explore the relationship between the input and the output of the PUF. For the
@
@
forward ANN, the previous 32-bit input challenge (a@
1 , a2 , ..., a32 )2 is in conjunction with

the current 32-bit input challenge (a1 , a2 , ..., a32 )2 are set as the input layer. By contrast,
the last output response B @ is reused to train the backward ANN.
In Fig. 3.9, s number of hidden layers exist in each ANN architecture and the k1 th,
(k1 = 1, 2, ..., s) hidden layer layer has uk1 number of neurons. Assume the weight of the
neuron es,k2 , (k2 = 1, 2, ..., us ) that corresponds to the output layer B is xs,k2 . Then the cost
function ∆f of the regular ANN and forward ANN can be denoted as

∆f = (

us
X

k2 =1

es,k2 xs,k2 + Ls − B)2

(3.37)
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Fig. 3.10: Prediction accuracy r∗ versus number of training CRPs n∗ for the WDDL-based
AES strong PUF under thee different deep-learning attacks (s = 3, u1 = 15, u2 = 30, and
u3 = 20).

where Ls is the unit bias of the sth hidden layer. Likewise, the cost function ∆f ∗ of the
backward ANN is derived as

∗

∆f = (

us
X

es,k2 xs,k2 + Ls + ∆xB @ − B)2

(3.38)

k2 =1

where ∆x is the weight of last output response B @ . By applying the backpropagation
and gradient descent algorithms into the ANNs, the ANNs can be trained with a reasonable
number of challenge-to-response pairs (CRPs) to predict the output response of the WDDLbased AES strong PUF under a certain input challenge.
If the ReLU function is selected for the ANNs, as shown in Fig. 3.10, even if 1 million
number of CRPs are enabled for training, the prediction accuracies of the three different
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deep-learning attacks on the 130 nm CMOS WDDL-based AES strong PUF are below 56%.
The result demonstrates that the proposed PUF is adequately robust against the state-ofthe-art machine-learning attacks.

3.6 CONCLUSION

A wave dynamic differential logic (WDDL)-based AES strong PUF is proposed as a
highly reliable and secure hardware primitive for authentication. By utilizing the WDDL
gates and the non-linear product math function, the WDDL-based AES strong PUF primitive achieves a nearly 50.7% inter-HD and 97.7% reliability while maintaining a low loss
ratio of input power entropy (< 25%) against power attacks and a huge linear matching
error (1032%) against machine-learning attacks.
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CHAPTER 4
A NOVEL PUF PRIMITIVE FOR GENERAL PROTECTION
AGAINST NON-INVASIVE ATTACKS ON IOT DEVICES

4.1 MOTIVATION

In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, two innovate PUF primitives are proposed: Converterreshuffling (CoRe) PUF exploits a mature power delivery device as the fundamental architecture of PUF primitive, while WDDL gate PUF utilizes a SCA-resistant logic gate
to accomplish the PUF design1 . Both designs achieve comprehensive designs against machine learning attacks and side-channel analysis attacks. Meanwhile, by means of adopting
existing hardware architecture to design new PUFs, both designs successfully integrated
two hardware security primitives and are of resilience to non-invasive attacks. Nonetheless,
based on investigations to side-channel attacks, attackers can perform SCA attacks with
either input power or output power [77]. In this case, attackers may perform SCA analysis
attack according to power traces from both ends and examine the correlation coefficients to
select a more vulnerable power signal. This requires us to insert SCA-resistant modules on
both ends of vulnerable devices. Simultaneously, in previous designs, only linear regression
(LR) attacks and simple machine learning models are examined. According to Fig. 2.7(a),
the insertion of hardware devices only induces limited promotion of non-linearity. Consequently, a novel PUF architecture against non-invasive attacks is proposed in this chapter,
aiming to impede the non-invasive attacks essentially.
1

The content of this Chapter partially has been published in [76].
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Fig. 4.1: Conceptual model of proposed comprehensive countermeasure to ML attacks and
SCA attacks. Both ends of the cryptographic circuit is protected by a ML model. The
uncertainty is retained by the keys stored/inserted on the cryptographic circuit.

The conceptual prototype can be found in Fig. 4.1. The conception is based on an
assumption that the cryptographic circuit, like AES circuit, is relative non-modelized. With
the uncertainty induced by random keys, the cryptographic circuit cannot be modeled by
simple machine learning attacks. However, since the operation of AES circuit is proved to be
vulnerable side-channel attacks [78], two side-channel-resistant models are thus implemented
on both ends of the AES model. Since the uncertainty is introduced by keys of AES
circuit, the frontend signal and the backend signal of the entire architecture should retain
uncertainty to attackers, which finally result in failures in both machine learning attacks and
SCA analysis attacks. In this chapter, we would focus on the prototype design and think of
possible vulnerable attack models. At the same time, we would evaluate the robustness to
higher level attack models comparing to LR attacks and simple ML attacks.

4.2 WORKING PRINCIPLE OF THE PROPOSED PUF

Fig. 4.2(a) shows a diagram of a conventional PUF chip under machine learning attacks.
Since both the input challenge C1 and the output response R1 are exposed to the adversary
directly, the PUF chip-1 can be cracked by machine learning attacks through training a
reasonable number of CRPs. If we explore the design by connecting a conventional PUF
circuit in series with an AES circuit to build a new PUF: hybrid PUF, as shown in Fig. 4.2(b),
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(a)

(b)

(c)

Fig. 4.2: Three different PUF chips under machine learning or side-channel attacks. (a)
Conventional PUF (PUF chip-1). (b) Hybrid PUF (PUF chip-2). (c) Key-updating (KU)
AES-embedded PUF (PUF chip-3).

the adversary may not be able to unriddle the secret information of the conventional PUF via
machine learning attacks directly. However, the hybrid PUF in Fig. 4.2(b) is not sufficiently
secure. The primary reason is that the output data R2 of the AES is exposed to the
adversary, therefore, the secret key Kc of the AES may be leaked to the adversary by
analyzing the correlation between the output data R2 and a certain physical leakage of the
PUF chip-2 if a side-channel attack is executed. Once the secret key Kc of the AES is
leaked, the output response R1 of the conventional PUF will also be disclosed. As a result,
the conventional PUF in Fig. 4.2(b) can be uncovered by training the (C1 , R1 ) pairs with
machine learning attacks ultimately.
So as to eliminate the threats from both side-channel and machine learning attacks, a
key-updating (KU) AES embedded PUF is proposed as shown in Fig. 4.2(c). The novel and
innovative PUF architecture is secure against machine learning attacks, without increasing
the degree of non-linearity between the CRPs. As indicated in Fig. 4.2(c), an AES circuit is
embedded between two conventional PUF circuits and the output response R1 of the PUF
#1 circuit is encrypted by the AES circuit to provide the input challenge R2 to the PUF
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#2 circuit. Since the output response R1 of the PUF #1 and the input challenge R2 of the
PUF #2 are concealed, the adversary is incapable of performing machine learning attacks
on either of the two PUF circuits.
Another novel idea is proposed to eliminate the threat of side-channel attacks, which does
not rely on the existing countermeasures. It is proposed to add a real-time key-updating
function to the architecture that combines the output response R1 of the PUF #1 with
the stored secret key Kc of the AES to create the actual key Kca used by the AES circuit
(Kca = R1 ⊕ Kc ). This is illustrated in Fig. 4.2(c). Since the input data R1 and the output
data R2 of the AES are unknown to the adversary and the actual secret key Kca of the AES
is updating in real-time, the adversary is unable to execute side-channel attacks to reveal
the stored secret key Kc .
4.3 ROBUSTNESS AGAINST MACHINE LEARNING ATTACKS

For an m-bit KU AES-embedded PUF as shown in Fig. 4.2(c), the input data/output
data of the PUF 1, the AES, and the PUF 2, respectively, are C1 /R1 , R1 /R2 , and R2 /R3 .
If the input challenge C1 is set as C1 = (c1,1 , c1,2 , · · · , c1,m )2 , the relationship between the
input challenge C1 and the output response R1 of the PUF 1 can be preliminarily modeled
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as

R1 =C1 × E1 = (c1,1 , c1,2 , · · · , c1,m )×


 e1,1 · · · e1,m
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 2,1 · · · e2,m

 .
..
..
 ..
.
.



em,1 · · · em,m






=
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X

c1 , iei,1 , · · · ,

i=1

m
X

!

(4.1)

c1 , iei,1

i=1

where E1 is the m × m matrix which represents the operation induced by the PUF 1 in
Fig. 4.2(c). ei,j , (i, j = 1, 2, · · · , m) is the element of the matrix E1 . Since the output data
Pm
P
R1 of the PUF 1 should be a binary data, the output data R1 = ( m
i=1 c1 , iei,1 )
i=1 c1 , iei,1 , · · · ,
as shown in (4.1) needs to be normalized by a step function u(x, ∆x) as shown below

u(x, ∆x) =




 1 , x ≥ ∆x

(4.2)



 0 , x < ∆x
where ∆x is the critical point of the step function u(x, ∆x). As a result, the output data
R1 of the PUF 1 under the normalization of the step function u(x, ∆x) can be precisely
determined as

R1 = u(C1 × E1 , ∆x1 )
=

u

m
X
i=1

!
c1 , iei,1 , ∆x1 , · · · , u

m
X

!!
c1 , iei,m , ∆x1

i=1

where ∆x1 is the critical point associated with the PUF 1.

(4.3)
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Similarly, the accurate output data R2 of the AES in Fig. 4.2(c) can also be derived as

R2 = u(u(C1 × E1 , ∆x1 ) × A, ∆x0 )

(4.4)

where ∆x0 is the critical point related with the AES and A is the m×m matrix that denotes
the math operation processed by the AES circuit as shown below (ai, j(C1 ) is the element
in matrix A)

 a1,1 (C1 )


 a (C )
 2,1 1
A=

..

.



am,1 (C1 )


···

a1,m (C1 ) 


· · · a1,m (C1 ) 

.

.
...

..



· · · a1,m (C1 )

(4.5)

Kindly note that the actual secret key Kca of the AES in Fig. 4.2(c) is updated by the
internal confidential data R1 in realtime, thus the element ai, j(C1) varies under a different
input challenge C1 .
Once the output data R2 of the AES is obtained, the m-bit output response R3 of the
KU AES-embedded PUF in Fig. 4.2(c) under the input challenge C1 is expressed as

R3 = u(R2 × E2 , ∆x2 )
(4.6)
= u (u (u (C1 × E1 , ∆x1 ) × A, ∆x0 ) × E2 , ∆x2 )

where ∆x2 is the critical point associated with the PUF 2 and E2 is the corresponding m×m
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TABLE 4.1: A CNN structure for modeling PUF primitives.

matrix induced by the PUF 2 that is written as (e∗i,j is the element in matrix E2 )
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(4.7)

4.3.1 CONVOLUTIONAL NEURAL NETWORK (CNN) ATTACKS ON PUF
PRIMITIVES

Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) are a kind of advanced machine learning algorithms that can be explored to reveal the secret information. If a CNN attack is performed
on a 128-bit regular PUF: arbiter PUF, the detailed CNN architecture for modeling the arbiter PUF is illustrated in Table 4.1. The 128-bit input challenge C1 = (c1,1 , c1,2 , · · · , c1,128 )2
of the arbiter PUF is transformed into a 8 × 16 × 1 matrix to establish the input training
data for the CNNs. Moreover, the most significant bit (MSB) of the output response of the
arbiter PUF is selected as the output training data for the CNN structure in Table 4.1.
In layer 1 (convolutional layer) of the CNNs, the 8 × 16 × 1 input matrix is changed
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into a 6 × 14 × 64 intermediate matrix, as shown in Table 4.1. The size of the 64 filters
(K) and activation function used in layer 1, respectively, are 3 × 3 and ReLU. In layer 2,
a max pooling operation is executed on the obtained 6 × 14 × 64 matrix to generate the
3 × 7 × 64 matrix. The main intention of executing max pooling is reducing the matrix size
and maintaining the critical features.
As shown in Table 4.1, in layer 3 and layer 4, a dropout operation and a flatten operation
are performed. Then the 1×1×1344 array is acquired when the flatten operation is finished.
The dropout probability that is used in layer 3 is set as 0.25. Furthermore, from layer 5 to
layer 9, dense operation and dropout operation are executed in the CNNs alternately. The
sizes of the output arrays of layer 5, layer 6, layer 7, and layer 8 are achieved as 1 × 1 × 1024,
1×1×1024, 1×1×512, and 1×1×512, respectively. The corresponding dropout probability
in layer 6 and layer 8 is selected as 0.75. Eventually, in the output of layer 9, the 1 × 1 × 2
array that is used for classifying the MSB of the output response as “0” or “1” is created.
Kindly note that the activation functions selected in layer 5, layer 7, and layer 9, respectively,
are ReLU, ReLU, and Softmax. The optimizer and loss function of the CNN training are
chosen with Adam and categorical cross-entropy, respectively. Additionally, the batch size
of the CNN training is optimized with 50.
A 128-bit KU AES-embedded PUF and a 128-bit arbiter PUF are simulated in Cadence
with the 130 nm IBM CMOS technology kit, respectively. Kindly note that the simulated
KU AES-embedded PUF consists of two 128-bit arbiter PUF circuits and one 128-bit AES
circuit. In addition, the corresponding CRPs of these two PUFs are also extracted from
Cadence simulation. As shown in Fig. 4.3, when the CNN attack is executed on the 128-bit
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(a)

(b)

Fig. 4.3: Training result of the CNN structure in Table 4.1 for modeling the MSB of the 128bit arbiter PUF (100,000 number of CRPs are enabled for training). (a) Accuracy versus
number of epochs. (b) Loss versus number of epochs.

TABLE 4.2: Training Results of the CNN structure for modeling the MSB of the 128-bit
KU AES-embedded PUF (number of epochs is 20).

arbiter PUF, after training about 1 × 105 data, the training (testing) accuracy is obtained
as 0.934 (0.927) and the corresponding training (testing) loss is 0.225 (0.234) when the
number of epochs is set as 20. By contrast, even if 1 million data are enabled for training,
the training/testing accuracy of the CNNs for modeling the 128-bit KU AES-embedded
PUF is still around 0.5, as shown in Table 4.2. Hence, the KU AES-embedded PUF we
propose exhibits a good robustness against the regular CNN attacks.
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(a)

(b)

Fig. 4.4: (a) AES in the KU AES-embedded PUF. (b) Equivalent PUF architecture for the
KU AES-embedded PUF.

4.3.2 NEW CONVOLUTIONAL NEURAL NETWORK (CNN) ATTACKS ON
THE PROPOSED PUF PRIMITIVE

In Section 4.3.1, since the stored key Kc in Fig. 4.2(c) is assumed to be unknown to the
adversary, the conventional CNN attacks attempt to disclose the confidential information of
the KU AES-embedded PUF by regarding the PUF as a black box. However, if the secret
key Kc is leaked, a novel CNN attack may be tailored to model the confidential information
of the KU AES-embedded PUF.
When the secret key Kc is leaked, the exact relationship between the input data R1 and
the output data R2 of the AES in Fig. 4.4(a) will be revealed. In other words, the secret
m × m matrix A associated with the AES is always exposed to the adversary. As a result,
only two PUF matrices E1 and E2 in (4.6) are unknown to the adversary. To simplify the
CNN attack, if the matrix E1 is selected with an m × m identity matrix I and the critical
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TABLE 4.3: Training results of the new CNN attack for modeling the MSB of the 128-bit
KU AES-embedded PUF (number of epochs is 20).

point ∆x1 is set as 0.5, (4.6) becomes

R3 = u(u(u(C1 × I, 0.5) × A, ∆x0 ) × E3 ,3 )

(4.8)

where E3 and ∆x3 , respectively, are the m × m matrix and critical point induced by an
equivalent PUF circuit. Since C1 × I × A × E3 is equal to C1 × A × E3 , a new PUF
architecture as shown in Fig. 4.4(b) can be devised to emulate the KU AES-embedded PUF
if the secret key Kc is disclosed.
In Fig. 4.4(b), PUF 3 is the equivalent PUF circuit that is related with the matrix E3
in (4.8). Furthermore, the output data R2 of the AES in Fig.4.4(a) can be unriddled since
the input data C1 and secret key Kc of the AES are open for the adversary. Accordingly,
a CNN attack can be performed on the equivalent PUF circuit: PUF 3 because its CRPs:
(R2∗ , R3 ) are available for training. Once the PUF 3 is cracked, the adversary is able to
predict output response R3 under any input challenge C1 .
Table4.3 shows the results of the new CNN attack on the 128-bit KU AES-embedded
PUF if the adversary knows the stored key Kc . The corresponding training/testing accuracy
can be over 0.9. Consequently, the most significant security concern for the KU AESembedded PUF is preventing the secret key Kc from being leaked to the adversary.
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4.4 RESILIENCE AGAINST SIDE-CHANNEL ATTACKS

For the KU AES-embedded PUF we propose, the input data R1 and output data R2 of
the AES in Fig. 4.2(c) are unknown to the adversary. As a result, to implement side-channel
attacks on the KU AES-embedded PUF to reveal the stored key Kc , the adversary can only
analyze the correlation between the input challenge C1 /output response R3 in Fig. 4.2(c)
and the physical leakages of the PUF chip.
Power attacks [50, 79, 80] are a kind of side-channel attacks that are widely used by
the adversary to disclose the secret key of a cryptographic circuit through monitoring the
correlation between the processed data and the power dissipation of the cryptographic circuit. For the m-bit KU AES-embedded PUF in Fig. 4.2(c), the input data R1 of the AES
Pm
P
is (u ( m
i=1 c1,i ei,m , ∆x1 ))2 as shown in (4.3). Suppose the m-bit
i=1 c1,i ei,1 , ∆x1 ) , · · · , u (
stored key Kc of the KU AES-embedded PUF is Kc = (kc,1 , kc,2 , · · · , kc,m )2 , the actual key
Kca of the AES in Fig. 4.2(c) becomes

Kca = R1 ⊕ Kc
=

u

m
X

!
c1,i ei,1 , ∆x1

⊕ kc,1 , · · · , u

i=1

m
X
i=1

!
c1,i ei,m , ∆x1

(4.9)

!
⊕ kc,m
2

As a result, the real secret key Kca will be updated in real-time if different input challenge
values: (c1,1 , c1,2 , · · · , c1,m )2 are enabled.
When a power attack is performed on the KU AES-embedded PUF, the adversary may
combine the input challenge with the hypothesized keys to predict the power dissipation
of the PUF at first. Then the correlation analysis will be executed between the predicted
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(a)

(b)

Fig. 4.5: Simulations of power attacks (hamming-weight (HW) model is used). (a) Absolute
value of correlation coefficient (AVCC) versus possible keys for leaking an 8-bit sub-key of
the 128-bit unprotected AES cryptographic circuit after inputting 1,000 number of data. (b)
AVCC versus possible keys for leaking an 8-bit sub-key of the 128-bit KU AES-embedded
PUF after inputting 1 million number of data.

power and the measured power to estimate the secret key. Fig. 4.5 shows the results of
simulated power attacks for (a) a 128-bit unprotected AES cryptographic circuit and (b)
the 128-bit KU AES-embedded PUF. As shown in Fig. 4.5(a), the 8-bit secret sub-key 96 of
the unprotected AES circuit is disclosed after inputting 1,000 plaintexts of data. However,
for the AES-embedded PUF, the secret sub-key 96 is masked from being leaked to the
adversary even if 1 million plaintexts are enabled, as shown in Fig. 4.5(b). In addition,
the absolute value of correlation coefficient (AVCC) of the correct key 96 in Fig. 4.5(b) is
two orders of magnitude lower than the AVCC of the correct key 96 in Fig. 4.5(a). The
primary reason is that the actual secret key in the embedded PUF is updating in real-time
which greatly weakens the correlation between the processed data and the power dissipation
against power attacks.
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(a)

(b)

Fig. 4.6: Performance evaluation for the 128-bit KU AES-embedded PUF. (a) Uniqueness
U and randomness R versus technology node Lg . (b) Reliability G versus supply voltage
Vdd and ambient temperature Ta (Lg = 130 nm).

4.5 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

Commonly, uniqueness, randomness, and reliability are the three most significant parameters for assessing the performance of a designed PUF [4, 47]. To evaluate the performance
of the proposed PUF, A 128-bit KU AES-embedded PUF is designed and simulated in Cadence software with the 130 nm CMOS technology kit. Moreover, Monte Carlo simulations
are executed on the designed PUF in Cadence to emulate the random fabrication process.
As shown in Fig. 4.6(a), the uniqueness U is improved from 52.4% to 50.4% if the CMOS
technology node Lg is scaled from 130 nm to 14 nm; while the randomness R improves from
47.1% to 49.5%. In addition, Fig. 4.6(b) shows the worst reliability of the embedded PUF is
about 97.4% when the supply voltage is 1.0 V. The simulation results manifest the proposed
PUF has excellent uniqueness, randomness, and reliability.
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4.6 CONCLUSION

A novel PUF-AES-PUF architecture in conjunction with a key-updating technique is
utilized to design a state-of-the-art PUF primitive that is able to resist non-invasive attacks.
The proposed PUF not only has excellent uniqueness (52.4%), randomness (47.1%), and
reliability (97.4%) but also maintains a high security level (> 1 million data) against both
side-channel and machine learning attacks.
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CHAPTER 5

HARDWARE TROJAN-BASED MALICIOUS ATTACKS ON
PHYSICAL UNCLONABLE FUNCTION SENSORS

5.1 MOTIVATION

In previous sections, three PUF primitives are proposed. Aiming at mainstream noninvasive attack models, all three models may resolve security problems in their respective
domains1 . According to different application scenarios, we believe those proposed work can
adopt most security demands in the protection of physical confidential signals. However,
the study of physical unclonable function primitives is only one aspect of the whole domain
of hardware security. However, it is always said, “The easiest way to capture a fortress is
from within.” Is there any way that attackers can bypass all external protection mechanisms
and steal confidential messages from within? This talks about another pivotal subject in
hardware security, hardware Trojans (HTs).
After considering all potential malicious attacks, a hardware system should be mounted
with countermeasures to SCA attacks, ML attacks, and HT attacks, as is shown in Fig. 5.1.
In this architecture, a key hardware element should put in the middle of the whole architecture, while its frontend and backend are SCA-resistant models which prevent steals and
analyses of physical signal leakages. For the sake of reducing vulnerabilities to modeling
attacks, some uncertainty should be injected to the system. In addition, on the basis of
1

The content of this Chapter partially has been published in [81].
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Fig. 5.1: A conceptual sketch of a hardware system that is well protected by countermeasures
to ML attacks, SCA attacks, and HT attacks.

the layout and analysis approach, the detection of hardware Trojans can be executed after
fabrication or in real-time. Since hardware Trojans are always implemented during fabrications and can be implemented in any chips. In this chapter, we make a more general
assumption that hardware Trojans are implemented on a PUF primitive. On the one hand,
the design of hardware Trojans need to consider well of the architecture design. If the Trojan is designed for a protection module, attackers do not bother to adjust their design for a
new architecture. And this will make their attacks more general and more effective. On the
other hand, the implementation of security module is enough for stealing data. Considering
the overhead of security modules, hardware devices may not implement redundant countermeasures. On account of the assumption, a hardware Trojan design will be proposed in this
chapter, which aims at stealing information processed by a PUF primitive. In the meantime, a detection approach will be presented. The detection is a golden-chip free method
which utilize mathematical analysis as its detection tool. To some extent, golden-chip free
approach is more practical to conventional method with golden chips. We hope this method
may be generalized to adapt to more Trojan detection situations.
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(a)

(b)

Fig. 5.2: (a) Architecture of a ROPUF [4]. (b) Oscillating frequencies versus supply voltage
for a ROPUF under the same input challenge [4]

5.2 REVIEW OF RING OSCILLATOR PUF (ROPUF) SENSOR

5.2.1 VULNERABILITIES IN CONVENTIONAL ROPUF DESIGNS

In a ROPUF, as shown in Fig. 5.2(a), k number of ring oscillators are utilized to output
the cipher responses. Despite the k number of ring oscillators are identically designed,
the oscillating frequency of each ring oscillator is different under the random fabrication
process. As a result, if two multiplexers are used to select two different ring oscillator loops,
the unpredictable mismatch of the oscillating frequency of the two selected ring oscillator
loops can be converted into the digital cipher data. For example, in Fig. 5.2(a), assume the
ring oscillator loops RO1 and RO2 are selected by the top multiplexer (mux) and the bottom
multiplexer under a certain input challenge, respectively. If the oscillating frequency of RO1
is higher or equal to the oscillating frequency of RO2 , the output response r = 1. Otherwise,
the output response r = 0.
As shown in Fig. 5.2(b), if the same challenge is applied into the ROPUF, strong linear
relationships exist between the supply voltage and the oscillating frequencies. However,
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Fig. 5.3: Classic Arbiter PUF using path-swapping switches [5].

due to the affects of the random fabrication process, the slope of the frequency-voltage
curve of each ring oscillator in the ROPUF is different. In other words, different supply
voltages can achieve different frequency mismatches. Consequently, a one-to-one relationship is established between the supply voltage and the output cipher data under the same
input challenge, as shown in Fig. 5.2(b). Moreover, since all the physical quantities like
temperature [82], pressure [83], and light luminosity [84] can be sensed and converted into
voltage signals without much effort, the ROPUF sensor is able to encrypt the sensed physical
quantity against the regular malicious attacks.

5.2.2 MACHINE LEARNING ATTACK ON A PUF PRIMITIVE

In this proposed work, we propose to design a hardware Trojan inclusion to extract critical confidential information in a PUF primitive. Therefore, a pivotal problem in this work
is after extracting system information with a Trojan, how to approximate the generation of
challenge response pairs (CRPs) with a further training in neural networks.
Some existing works made efforts in attack PUF primitives via convolutional neural
networks (CNN). In a paper that is proposed in 2016 [85], authors managed to use machine
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Fig. 5.4: CRPs data transformation and extension [6].

learning algorithm to crack an arbiter PUF using variant machine learning algorithm. The
basic architecture of arbiter PUF is proposed in Fig. 5.3. In the proposed architecture,
the input signal is c[0] to c[n], which use switch arrays to select signal paths for two input
signals. Kindly note that the input signal is split into two paths at the origin, while each
switch in the chain will select one signal to pass the top channel and the other signal will
pass the lower channel. Due to the fabrication variations among all switches, the overall
passing time for two split signals will exhibit a tiny mismatch at the end of the chain. As a
result, the arbiter in the end is then used to sense the arrival of trigger signals in two paths
and decide the response output at the port r. In such case, for a particular input node
c[i], its followed challenge signal c[i + 1] will inherit the accumulated time delay in previous
challenge node c[i]. As a result, adjacent input challenge nodes are of sequential correlation
induced by time delay. On the other hand, since the output response r is mechanically
generated by the challenge input. The output response will be then of sequential correlation
in adjacent output nodes as well. Therefore, in theory, using CNN as attack mechanism to
a PUF primitive is rational.
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Fig. 5.5: Basic architecture of a 128-bit Trojan-infected ROPUF

In addition to [85], some other works also make efforts in cracking PUF with CNN
networks. [6] proposed a CRP transformation and expansion technique for an arbiter PUF.
Their extension mechanism is as shown in Fig. 5.4. Their method is to decompose delay
signature between two adjacent input nodes, while in a further extension, by shifting bits
of Xi and Yi , the delay signature will be then formatted as two-dimensional image. By
using the extended data as input and the response as output, authors apply CNN as attack
models for the proposed arbiter PUF and assert this data modeling method is more effective.
In this work, we would use a similar CNN architecture to perform modeling attack on the
ROPUF.

5.3 DESIGN OF TROJAN-INFECTED ROPUF

The vulnerability of a ROPUF sensor is the high linear relationship between the supply
voltage and the oscillating frequency of a single ring oscillator loop. If the critical oscillating
frequency in the ROPUF is disclosed to the adversary through utilizing a Trojan circuit,
the adversary may estimate the variations of the supply voltage and the physical quantity
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(a)

(b)

Fig. 5.6: (a) Architecture of the Trojan trigger1 . (b) Architecture of the Trojan trigger2

by monitoring the variations of the leaked oscillating frequency.
The basic architecture of a 128-bit Trojan-infected ROPUF is shown in Fig. 5.5. There
are two Trojan triggers: Trojan trigger1 and Trojan trigger2 in the embedded Trojan circuit.
When the Trojan trigger1 is activated, the enable signal EN in Fig. 5.6(a) will activate the
switch W11 and deactivate the switch W12 to output the original clock signal fc to activate
the Trojan counter and 128-bit register in Fig. 5.5. As a result, as shown in Fig. 5.5, the
oscillating frequency fi of the i th, (i = 1, 2, ..., k) ring oscillator loop ROi in the ROPUF
is extracted by the inserted Trojan counter. The output of the Trojan counter is a 128-bit
binary data (a1 , a2 , ..., a128 )2 or a1 : a128 that includes the information of the oscillating
frequency fi . Subsequently, the 128-bit binary data a1 : a128 is fed into the 128-bit register
to generate the 128-bit critical output data b1 : b128 , as shown in Fig. 5.5. However, if the
Trojan trigger1 is inactive, EN in Fig. 5.6(a) turns off the switch W11 and turns on the
switch W12 to generate the high voltage Vdd to deactivate the sequential circuits: Trojan
counter and 128-bit register in Fig. 5.5. In such a case, the dynamic power dissipation of the
embedded Trojan circuit will be significantly reduced to evade the regular Trojan detection.
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Fig. 5.6(b) shows the architecture of the Trojan trigger2 .The Trojan trigger2 consists of
a D flip-flop, an inverter, and two switches. The primary role of the D flip-flop is achieving
the frequency division. When the Trojan trigger2 is activated by the adversary, the enable
signal EN in Fig. 5.6(b) becomes 1, thus the D flip-flop will output a new clock signal fT
whose frequency is a half of the frequency of the original clock signal fc . Moreover, since
the EN signal activates the switch W21 and deactivates the switch W22 in Fig. 5.6(b), the
Trojan trigger2 outputs the clock signal fT . Hence, the clock signal fT turns on/off the
∗
switches S1 : S128 and the switches S1∗ : S128
in Fig. 5.5 alternately. Ultimately, in Fig. 5.5,
∗
will become r1 : r128 , b1 : b128 , r1 : r128 , b1 : b128 , ... once the
the output response r1∗ : r128

Trojan trigger2 is activated. This indicates the information of the oscillating frequency fi
can be disclosed covertly in the output response of the Trojan-infected ROPUF.
However, if the Trojan trigger2 is inactive, the EN signal turns off the switch W21 and
turns on the switch W22 in Fig. 5.6(b) to output the high voltage Vdd . Under such a
∗
condition, in Fig. 5.5, the switches S1 : S128 will be turned on while the switches S1∗ : S128
∗
of the Trojan-infected
will be turned off. Accordingly, the 128-bit output response r1∗ : r128

ROPUF is equal to the 128-bit output response r1 : r128 of the Trojan-free ROPUF. This
means the Trojan-infected ROPUF behaves as a regular ROPUF when the Trojan trigger1
and Trojan trigger2 are inactive.
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5.4 RETRIEVAL OF CONFIDENTIAL DATA

5.4.1 DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENTIAL DATA WITH HARDWARE TROJAN ATTACKS

To successfully uncover the secret information of a 128-bit Trojan-infected ROPUF sensor, the adversary needs to perform regular wireless attacks to obtain the 128-bit input
∗
of the Trojan-infected ROPUF at
challenge C = c1 : c128 and output response R∗ = r1∗ : r128

first. Next, the adversary may activate the Trojan trigger1 and Trojan trigger2 in Fig. 5.5
to reveal the information of the critical oscillating frequency fi via wireless communication.
When the Trojan trigger1 in Fig. 5.5 is activated, the Trojan trigger1 will generate the
original clock signal fc to drive the sequential circuits: Trojan counter and 128-bit register.
Hence, the analog oscillating frequency fi is converted into a 128-bit digital data a1 : a128
under the assistance of the Trojan counter. Furthermore, the role of the 128-bit register is
delaying the signal a1 : a128 with a clock period. This means the output data b1 : b128 of the
128-bit register is equal to the previous value of a1 : a128 .
In Fig. 5.5, if the Trojan trigger2 is activated by the adversary, it will output a new
∗
clock signal fT to control the activation patterns of the switches S1 : S128 and S1∗ : S128
.

Kindly note that the frequency ratio between the new clock signal fT and the original clock
frequency fc is designed as 1:2. Under such a condition, the data sequence that is sent out by
the Trojan-infected ROPUF in Fig. 5.5 is r1 (t) : r128 (t), a1 (t) : a128 (t), r1 (t+Tc ) : r128 (t+Tc ),
a1 (t + Tc ) : a128 (t + Tc ), r1 (t + 2Tc ) : r128 (t + 2Tc ), a1 (t + 2Tc ) : a128 (t + 2Tc ), · · · where t
is the timing and Tc is the period of the clock signal fc . Therefore, the information of the
critical oscillating frequency fi can be extracted in the output response of the Trojan-infected
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Fig. 5.7: Detailed structure of the CNNs with two convolutional layers for cracking the
128-bit Trojan-infected ROPUF

ROPUF once the Trojan trigger1 and Trojan trigger2 are activated.
5.4.2 DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENTIAL DATA WITH MACHINE LEARNING ATTACKS

As introduced in Section 5.4.1, under the assistance of the hardware Trojan attacks, the
adversary is capable of acquiring the 128-bit input challenge c1 : c128 , actual output response
r1 : r128 , and oscillating frequency information a1 : a128 of the Trojan-infected ROPUF by
activating the embedded Trojan circuit. Next, the adversary may use machine learning techniques to model the Trojan-infected ROPUF with the leaked data. Once Trojan-infected
ROPUF is cracked by machine learning techniques, the adversary can deactivate the embedded Trojan circuit and is able to predict the variations of the sensed data at any time.
To study machine learning attacks on the Trojan-infected ROPUF, a state-of-the-art
machine learning algorithm, CNN, is chosen for modeling the exact relationship among
c1 : c128 , r1 : r128 , and a1 : a128 .
The detailed architecture of the CNNs for modeling the Trojan-infected ROPUF is designed as shown in Fig. 5.7. The input challenge c1 : c128 and actual output response r1 : r128
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of the Trojan-infected ROPUF are selected for training the CNNs. In Fig. 5.7, a 16 × 16 × 1
matrix A that contains the information of c1 : c128 and r1 : r128 is established as the input
training data of the CNNs. Furthermore, the oscillating frequency information a1 : a128 is
extracted for generating the output training data of the CNNs. By converting the binary
data a1 : a128 into the decimal data ω, we can obtain ω as ω =

P128

j=1

aj 2j−1 . Suppose the

minimum and maximum values of ω are ωmin and ωmax , respectively. Therefore, if there are
N number of different values for the decimal data ω, the i1 th, (i1 = 1, 2, ..., N ) value ωi1
can be derived as

ω i1 =

i1 − 1
(ωmax − ωmin ) + ωmin .
N −1

(5.1)

As shown in Fig. 5.7, the devised CNNs include two convolutional layers. Firstly, when
36 number of 3 × 3 filters perform the convolution operation on the 16 × 16 × 1 input matrix
A with the ReLU function, the matrix A is converted into a 14 × 14 × 36 matrix. Then the
14 × 14 × 36 matrix is transformed into the 7 × 7 × 36 matrix after executing a max pooling
operation to extract the critical features. Subsequently, a dropout operation transforms the
7 × 7 × 36 matrix into another 7 × 7 × 36 matrix with a 0.25 probability. These are the
operations that are achieved in the 1st convolutional layer.
In the 2nd convolutional layer, as shown in Fig. 5.7, convolution operation, max pooling
operation, and dropout operation are performed on the newest 7 × 7 × 36 matrix to create a
6 × 6 × 36 matrix, the 3 × 3 × 36 matrix, and a 3 × 3 × 36 matrix, sequentially. Kindly note
that the size of the filters used in the 2nd convolutional layer is 2 × 2 and the corresponding
dropout probability is set as 0.25.
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(a)

(b)

Fig. 5.8: Training result of the devised CNNs with 100,000 number of training data (the
batch size of the training is set as 100 and N is chosen as 10). (a) Accuracy versus number
of epochs. (b) Loss versus number of epochs

Once the latest 3 × 3 × 36 matrix in Fig. 5.7 is generated, under the assistance of the
flatten operation, the 1 × 1 × 324 array is created. Moreover, after executing dense and
dropout operations on the new created 1 × 1 × 324 array sequentially, two intermediate
1 × 1 × 512 arrays are acquired, as indicated in Fig. 5.7. The probability for this dropout
operation is set as 0.75. Eventually, when the last dense operation is implemented on the
latest 1 × 1 × 512 array with a Softmax function, the 1 × 1 × N array that is used for
classification can be obtained. Kindly note that the 1 × 1 × N array stores the probabilities:
p1 , p2 , ..., pN for all the possible values of ωi1 : ω1 , ω2 , ..., ωN to realize classification. For
example, if p1 is the highest probability among all the probabilities: p1 , p2 , ..., pN , the output
of the CNNs is selected as ω1 . Similarly, if pN shows the highest value, the CNNs set the
corresponding output as ωN .
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the CNN attack on the proposed Trojan-infected
ROPUF, the training data need to be collected at first. A 130 nm and 128-bit CMOS
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Fig. 5.9: Architecture of the Trojan-infected ROPUF sensor for sensing the dynamic current
of an AES cryptographic circuit

Trojan-infected ROPUF is simulated in Cadence. By triggering the embedded Trojan circuit, the input challenge c1 : c128 , actual output response r1 : r128 , and oscillating frequency
information a1 : a128 of the Trojan-infected ROPUF can be extracted from Cadence. As a
result, the training data of the CNNs can be acquired from the Cadence simulation. In the
CNN training, the loss function and optimizer are chosen with categorical crossentropy and
adam, respectively. After enabling 100,000 data to train the CNNs, as shown in Fig. 5.8, the
training (testing) accuracy and loss are about 0.929 (0.910) and 0.203 (0.205), respectively,
when the number of epochs is 60. Furthermore, as indicated in Table 5.1, if the number
of training data for the CNNs is increased from 100,000 to 200,000, the training accuracy/testing accuracy (TRA/TEA) increases and the training loss/testing loss (TRL/TEL)
decreases. However, when the number of training data is further increased from 200,000 to
500,000, the TRA/TEA decreases. That indicates 500,000 training data may cause an “overfitting” problem to the designed CNNs. Therefore, as shown in Table 5.1, machine learning
techniques are capable of achieving over 0.94 (0.92) TRA (TEA) on the Trojan-infected
ROPUF.

92
TABLE 5.1: Training results of the CNNs with different number of training data (number
of epochs is 60 and batch size is 100)

5.4.3 DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENTIAL DATA WITH SIDE-CHANNEL ATTACKS

Side-channel attacks [17, 63, 79] are a kind of powerful non-invasive attacks that can
be utilized by the adversary to leak the secret information of ICs through analyzing the
correlation between the processed data and the physical leakages of the ICs (i.e. power
dissipation, electromagnetic emission, and timing information). In order to demonstrate
that leaking the critical frequency fi of the Trojan-infected ROPUF sensor as mentioned
in Section 5.3 is sufficient to retrieve the confidential information of IoT, a representative
example about implementing side-channel attacks on the Trojan-infected ROPUF sensor is
analyzed in this Section.
Advanced encryption standard (AES) is a popular algorithm that can be utilized to
encrypt the critical data against the adversary [17, 79]. Fig. 5.9 shows an architecture of
the Trojan-infected ROPUF sensor that is used for monitoring the variations of the dynamic
current of an AES cryptographic circuit. Assume the secret key and plaintext of the AES
cryptographic circuit are Kc and P , respectively. When different plaintexts are inputted into
the AES cryptographic circuit sequentially, the dynamic current Id of the AES cryptographic
circuit varies all the time. If a resistor R0 is selected to sense the variations of the dynamic
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current Id of the AES cryptographic circuit, as shown in Fig. 5.9, the output critical voltage
Vref can be denoted as

Vref = Vdd − Id R0

(5.2)

where Vdd is the voltage of the power source. Moreover, as shown in Fig. 5.9, a low-dropout
(LDO) voltage regulator is utilized to manipulate the supply voltage VS of the Trojaninfected ROPUF. However, since the LDO regulator is controlled by the critical voltage
Vref , the relationship between the supply voltage VS and the critical voltage Vref in Fig. 5.9
is determined as

VS = (1 +

R1
)Vref
R2

(5.3)

where R1 and R2 are the biased resistances of the LDO regulator.
As mentioned in Section 5.2, linear relationships exist between the supply voltage and
the oscillating frequencies of the ring oscillators of the ROPUF. Therefore, the oscillating
frequency fi of the i th ring oscillator loop ROi in the ROPUF can be precisely derived as

fi = λi VS + βi = λi (1 +
= λi (1 +

R1
)Vref + βi
R2

R1
)(Vdd − Id R0 ) + βi = G(Id )
R2

(5.4)
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where λi and βi are the slope and constant of the frequency-voltage curve of ROi in the
ROPUF, respectively. G(Id ) is the linear function that is used to represent the relationship
between the dynamic current Id and the critical frequency fi . For the Trojan-infected
ROPUF sensor as shown in Fig. 5.9, the critical frequency fi is leaked to the adversary via
the inserted Trojan circuit and machine learning techniques. As a result, the adversary may
obtain the confidential information of the AES cryptographic circuit through analyzing the
variations of the critical frequency fi .
If the adversary selects the side-channel analysis to retrieve the secret key Kc of the
AES cryptographic circuit in the Trojan-infected ROPUF sensor, the correlation between
the input plaintext P and the leaked frequency fi is likely to be explored by the adversary.
Assume X number of different plaintexts: P1 , P2 , ..., PX are inputted into the AES cryptographic circuit, the corresponding dynamic current values of the AES cryptographic circuit
are: Id,1 , Id,2 , ..., Id,X . Then the correlation between P1 , P2 , ..., PX and Id,1 , Id,2 , ..., Id,X
can be explored to disclose the secret key Kc with the side-channel analysis. However, since
the critical frequency fi strongly correlates with the dynamic current Id as shown in (3),
the correlation between P1 , P2 , ..., PX and G(Id,1 ), G(Id,2 ), ..., G(Id,X ) can also be studied
to retrieve the secret key Kc .
As to the Trojan-free ROPUF sensor, conversely, the critical frequency fi is unknown
to the adversary. If the side-channel analysis is performed on the Trojan-free ROPUF
sensor, the adversary may analyze the correlation between the input plaintexts of the AES
cryptographic circuit and the output cipher responses of the ROPUF to estimate the secret
key Kc .
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(a)

(b)

Fig. 5.10: Absolute value of correlation coefficient (AVCC) versus all the possible keys for
the ROPUF sensors under the side-channel analysis (Hamming-weight model is used). (a)
Trojan-infected ROPUF sensor with 3,000 input plaintexts. (b) Trojan-free ROPUF sensor
with 1 million input plaintexts

Both the Trojan-free and Trojan-infected ROPUF sensors are simulated in Cadence
with the 130 nm CMOS technology kits. A 128-bit AES cryptographic circuit acts as the
sensing load for both the Trojan-free and Trojan-infected ROPUF sensors in the simulations.
As shown in Fig. 5.10(a), if the side-channel analysis is applied on the Trojan-infected
ROPUF sensor by exploring the correlation between P1 , P2 , ..., PX and G(Id,1 ), G(Id,2 ), ...,
G(Id,X ), only 3,000 plaintexts are sufficient to leak the secret key 24 that corresponds to a
substitution-box (S-box) of the AES cryptographic circuit due to the leakage of the critical
frequency fi . By contrast, as shown in Fig. 5.10(b), even if 1 million plaintexts are enabled
on the Trojan-free ROPUF sensor, the secret key 24 corresponds to the S-box of the AES
cryptographic circuit is successfully masked from being disclosed to the adversary since no
critical leakage is available for the adversary.
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5.5 TROJAN DETECTION

In a Trojan-free ROPUF IoT sensor, the original physical quantity is sensed and converted into a critical voltage signal at first. Then both the critical voltage signal and the
input challenge are encrypted by the Trojan-free ROPUF to generate the output cipher data.
Subsequently, the cipher data will be sent to the host via wireless communication. Once
the cipher data are received by the host, the values of the original physical quantity can
be deciphered through checking the stored look-up table (LUT) of the Trojan-free ROPUF.
Since the physical quantity commonly conforms to a Gaussian distribution [17, 86], the host
is able to obtain Gaussian distributed sensed data after deciphering the received cipher data.
By contrast, for a Trojan-infected ROPUF IoT sensor, the case is different. As shown in
Fig. 5.5, when the embedded Trojan circuit is inactive, the Trojan-infected ROPUF behaves
like a Trojan-free ROPUF. As a result, the host is also capable of acquiring Gaussian distributed sensed data. However, once the embedded Trojan circuit is activated, as mentioned
in Section 5.4.1, the Trojan-infected ROPUF will send false cipher data to the host. After
deciphered the false cipher data, the obtained data are closer to random data that may not
conform to a Gaussian distribution.
To verify the effectiveness of the proposed Trojan detection methodology, the architecture as shown in Fig. 5.9 is studied as the representative sample. When two different cases:
an AES cryptographic circuit with a Trojan-free ROPUF sensor and an AES cryptographic
circuit with a Trojan-infected ROPUF sensor are selected for studying the Trojan detection,
the sensed data is the dynamic current Id of the AES cryptographic circuit. After executing two independent tests: Test #1 and Test #2 on these two cases, the corresponding
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(a)

(b)

Fig. 5.11: Distributions of the sensed data after executing two independent tests (each test
contains 5,000 sensed data). (a) An AES cryptographic circuit with a Trojan-free ROPUF
sensor. (b) An AES cryptographic circuit with a Trojan infected ROPUF sensor

distributions of the sensed data are obtained in Fig. 5.11. As indicated in Fig. 5.11(a),
the sensed dynamic current Id of an AES cryptographic circuit with a Trojan-free ROPUF
sensor well conforms a Gaussian distribution. Conversely, for an AES cryptographic circuit
with a Trojan-infected ROPUF sensor, Fig. 5.11(b) shows the sensed dynamic current Id
complies with a non-Gaussian distribution. Accordingly, by monitoring the distribution of
the sensed data in real-time, the Trojan-infected ROPUF sensor chips will be identified.

5.6 CONCLUSION

A hardware Trojan attack is performed in the ring oscillator PUF (ROPUF) sensors of
IoT by embedding a sequential Trojan circuit into the chip to leak the critical frequency to
the adversary. As demonstrated in the result, after leaking 200,000 critical data by triggering
the embedded Trojan circuit, the Trojan-infected ROPUF can be precisely modeled under
the assistance of machine learning techniques. Additionally, by monitoring the distribution
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of the sensed data received from each IoT sensor in real-time, the Trojan-infected ROPUF
sensor chips can be successfully detected.
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CHAPTER 6

COMBINING SIDE-CHANNEL ANALYSIS AND MACHINE
LEARNING MODELS IN EFFICIENT ATTACKS ON XOR
PUFS

6.1 MOTIVATION

In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, two PUF designs are proposed to enhance the non-linear
relationship between input challenge and output response1 . The main reason is that under
the hard limitation of hardware resources, the most effective approach to promote the PUF
security is to increase the non-linearity [88, 89, 90]. So as to improve the degree of nonlinearity between input challenge and output response against ML attacks, XOR PUFs
[91, 92] were proposed by using XOR functions to process the corresponding output response.
One thing that needs to be emphasized is that the increasing of algorithm complexity cannot
confront all machine learning attacks. However, under the same network scale and cracking
time, if a PUF is designed with a more complex non-linear algorithm, attackers may spend
more time and effort on the data analysis.
To some extent, a simple convolutional neural network (CNN) model may not be efficient
to an XOR PUF with complex non-linear algorithm. The plausible explanation is that the
CNN attack is unable to extract the critical correlation among the N input challenge bits
of the XOR PUF since the N input challenge bits are mutually independent. However,
1

The content of this Chapter partially has been published in [87].
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if a SCA attack is performed prior to CNN attack, will some non-linearity be reduced or
eliminated, and result in a vulnerability to further CNN attacks? In this short section, a
hybrid attack model is performed on a XOR PUF to examine its robustness to the novel
hybrid attack model.

6.2 PRINCIPLE OF SC-ASSISTED CNN ATTACK

Fig. 6.1 shows the fundamental architecture of a 128-bit arbiter XOR PUF. The 128-bit
input challenge (c1 , c2 , ..., c128 )2 is fed into four identically designed PUF blocks: arbiter PUF
#1, arbiter PUF #2, arbiter PUF #3, and arbiter PUF #4, respectively. Due to the affects
of random fabrication process, these four PUF blocks generate four different responses: r1 ,
r2 , r3 , and r4 , as shown Fig. 6.1. Eventually, an XOR operation is performed on r1 , r2 , r3 ,
and r4 to create the output response R of the XOR arbiter PUF (R = r1 ⊕ r2 ⊕ r3 ⊕ r4 ).
If a regular CNN attack is executed to model the relationship between the input challenge
(c1 , c2 , ..., c128 )2 and the output response R of the XOR arbiter PUF, the 128-bit input
challenge (c1 , c2 , ..., c128 )2 will be processed by convolution operations. Unfortunately, no
significant features can be extracted after applying the convolution operations since there
is no correlation among the 128 input challenge bits: (c1 , c2 , ..., c128 )2 .
In order to generate highly correlated input challenge bits to significantly improve the
efficacy of CNN attack on the 128-bit XOR arbiter PUF, SC analyses can be utilized
to pre-process the 128 uncorrelated input challenge bits: (c1 , c2 , ..., c128 )2 . In the proposed SC-assisted CNN attack, the 128-bit input challenge (c1 , c2 , ..., c128 )2 is added to a
128-bit intermediate data (a1 , a2 , ..., a128 )2 to generate the 128 correlated input challenge
bits: (c∗1 , c∗2 , ..., c∗128 )2 where c∗i = ci ⊕ ai , (i = 1, 2, ..., 128). Suppose the input challenge
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(c1 , c2 , ..., c128 )2 is uniformly divided into m groups, the input challenge of the kth, (k =
1, 2, ..., m) group can be denoted as (c(k−1) 128 +1 , c(k−1) 128 +2 , ..., ck 128 )2 . As a result, the correm

m

m

lated input challenge of the kth group can be derived as (c∗(k−1) 128 +1 , c∗(k−1) 128 +2 , · · · , c∗k 128 )2 =
m

m

m

(c(k−1) 128 +1 ⊕ a(k−1) 128 +1 , c(k−1) 128 +2 ⊕ a(k−1) 128 +2 , ..., ck 128 ⊕ ak 128 )2 .
m

m

m

m

m

m

To obtain the optimum (a(k−1) 128 +1 , a(k−1) 128 +2 , ..., ak 128 )2 for achieving the target chalm

m

m

lenge sequence (c∗(k−1) 128 +1 , c∗(k−1) 128 +2 , · · · , c∗k 128 )2 with the maximum correlation, SC analm

m

m

yses can be deployed to realize the optimization. Since (a(k−1) 128 +1 , a(k−1) 128 +2 , ..., ak 128 )2
m

is a

128
-bit
m

m

m

binary data, we can hypothesize 2128/m possible values from (0, 0, ...., 0)2 to

(1, 1, ...., 1)2 for it. Assume the power consumption of the 128-bit XOR arbiter PUF is Pd .
If n number of different (c(k−1) 128 +1 , c(k−1) 128 +2 , ..., ck 128 )2 values are inputted into the 128m

m

m

bit XOR arbiter PUF, the corresponding n number of different Pd values can be collected.
Suppose hamming-weight (HW) model is selected for executing the SC analyses, the correlation between

P128/m
j=1

c(k−1) 128 +j ⊕ a(k−1) 128 +j and Pd can be studied for estimating the
m

m

optimum (a(k−1) 128 +1 , a(k−1) 128 +2 , ..., ak 128 )2 . When 2128/m different correlation coefficients
m

m

m

are acquired by hypothesizing 2128/m possible values for (a(k−1) 128 +1 , a(k−1) 128 +2 , ..., ak 128 )2 ,
m

m

m

the possible value that corresponds to the highest correlation coefficient is regarded as the
optimum (a(k−1) 128 +1 , a(k−1) 128 +2 , ..., ak 128 )2 value. Under such a condition, the 128-bit inm

m

m

termediate data (a1 , a2 , ..., a128 )2 can be fully determined through applying the SC analyses
on each group individually. Moreover, the total computational complexity for estimating
(a1 , a2 , ..., a128 )2 is m × 2128/m .
After executing the SC analyses on the 128-bit XOR arbiter PUF, the new 128-bit input
challenge (c∗1 , c∗2 , ..., c∗128 )2 can be generated. To study the correlation among c∗1 , c∗2 , ..., c∗128 ,
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Fig. 6.1: Basic architecture of a 128-bit XOR arbiter PUF (r1 , r2 , r3 , r4 , and R are single
bit data)

(a)

(b)

Fig. 6.2: Correlation analyses for the original input challenge (c1 , c2 , ...,P
c128 )2 and new input
∗
challenge (c∗1 , c∗2 , ..., c∗128 )2 . (a) Correlation coefficient (between c∗1 and 128
i=1 ci ) and computational complexity versus number of group m. (b) Correlation coefficient verus ith bit for
Case A, Case B, and Case C (m = 16)

two new correlation coefficients: r(c∗i ,
fined. r(c∗i ,

P128

∗
i=1 ci )

of all the bits:

P128

∗
i=1 ci )

and r(c∗i ,

P128/m
j=1

c∗[ i×m ]× 128 +j ) need to be de128

m

represents the correlation coefficient between the ith bit: c∗i and the HW

P128

∗
i=1 ci .

Similarly, r(c∗i ,

P128/m
j=1

c∗[ i×m ]× 128 +j ) denotes the correlation coeffi128

m

cient between the ith bit: c∗i and the HW of the group that includes c∗i :

P128/m
j=1

c∗[ i×m ]× 128 +j .
128

m

The 128-bit XOR arbiter PUF as shown in Fig. 6.1 is designed and simulated in Cadence
with the 130 nm CMOS technology kit. The architecture of the four identically designed
PUF blocks in Fig. 6.1 is chosen from [93]. Moreover, the SC analyses are executed on the
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128-bit XOR arbiter PUF by extracting the correlation between the input challenge and the
power consumption of the PUF from the simulation. As shown in Fig. 6.2(a), a balanced
correlation coefficient 0.2258 and computational complexity 4096 can be achieved for the
new input challenge (c∗1 , c∗2 , ..., c∗128 )2 if the number of groups m is chosen as 16. In Fig. 6.2(b),
three different cases: Case A, Case B, and Case C are analyzed. Case A (Case B ) reflects
the correlation coefficient between the ith bit and the HW of all the bits related with the
original input challenge (c1 , c2 , ..., c128 )2 (new input challenge (c∗1 , c∗2 , ..., c∗128 )2 ). When we
compare Case A and Case B, it is apparent that the correlation coefficients among all the
input challenge bits are significantly increased after applying the SC analyses. Furthermore,
Case C in Fig. 6.2(b) represents the correlation coefficient between the ith bit and the HW
of the group that includes c∗i associated with (c∗1 , c∗2 , ..., c∗128 )2 . If Case B and Case C are
selected for comparison, it demonstrates that the correlation among the neighbor data in
the new input challenge (c∗1 , c∗2 , ..., c∗128 )2 is strongly reinforced. This strong correlation can
be used for improving the efficiency of CNN attack on the XOR arbiter PUF.

6.3 COMPARISON BETWEEN THE PROPOSED ATTACK AND A
REGULAR CNN ATTACK
As demonstrated in Fig. 6.2(a), if the number of groups m is set as 16, the optimum
SC analyses can be realized. In such a case, if a CNN attack is executed to process the
correlated input challenge (c∗1 , c∗2 , ..., c∗128 )2 , the 32 × 4 × 1 matrix C ∗ as shown in Fig. 6.3
is created as the input training data for the CNNs. Kindly note that the challenge bits
within group #1, group #2, ... group #16 are placed together in the matrix C ∗ . The
primary intention is maximizing the correlation among the neighbor data for assisting the
convolution operations. In the convolutional stage, 32 number of 3 × 3 filters are performed
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Fig. 6.3: Convolutional layer of the SC-assisted CNN attack for modeling the 128-bit XOR
arbiter PUF

on the matrix C ∗ to generate a 30 × 2 × 32 matrix D with the convolution operations and
a ReLU function, as shown in Fig. 6.3. For instance, the element d1,1,1 of the matrix D in
Fig. 6.3 can be written as

d1,1,1 = max{0,

6
X

d∗1,1,1,h c∗h }

(6.1)

h=1

where d∗1,1,1,1 , d∗1,1,1,2 , ..., d∗1,1,1,6 are the 6 parameters of the filter that are related with the
element d1,1,1 . After executing the max pooling operation, the 30 × 2 × 32 matrix D is
transformed into the 15 × 1 × 32 matrix E, as shown in Fig. 6.3. Then a dropout operation
is used for converting the 15 × 1 × 32 matrix E into another 15 × 1 × 32 matrix E ∗ with a
0.2 dropout probability. These aforementioned steps are achieved in the convolutional layer
of the CNNs.
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(a)

(b)

Fig. 6.4: Training result of the SC-assisted CNN attack on the 128-bit XOR arbiter PUF.
(a) Accuracy versus number of epochs. (b) Loss versus number of epochs

So as to classify the output response R of the 128-bit XOR arbiter PUF with a high
logic value ”1” or a low logic value ”0”, the 15 × 1 × 32 matrix E ∗ needs to be converted
into a 1 × 1 × 2 array ultimately. To achieve this goal, in the designed CNNs, the 15 × 1 × 32
matrix E ∗ is converted into the 1 × 1 × 480 array, a 1 × 1 × 720 array, a 1 × 1 × 720 array,
and a 1 × 1 × 2 array by using a flatten operation, a dense operation, a dropout operation,
and a dense operation, respectively. The dropout probability of the last dropout operation
is set as 0.8 and a Softmax function is used in the final dense operation.
To train the CNNs that are used for executing the SC-assisted CNN attack, the corresponding loss function and optimizer are chosen as binary crossentropy and adam, respectively. The batch size for the CNN training is optimized with 100. As shown in Fig. 6.4(a),
after enabling 150,000 training data, the SC-assisted CNN attack is able to achieve a 0.984
(0.982) training (testing) accuracy on the 128-bit XOR arbiter PUF when the number of
epochs is chosen as 40. Fig. 6.4(b) shows the corresponding training (testing) loss is about
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(a)

(b)

Fig. 6.5: Training result of the regular CNN attack on the 128-bit XOR arbiter PUF. (a)
Accuracy versus number of epochs. (b) Loss versus number of epochs

0.006 under such a training (testing) accuracy.
If a regular CNN attack is performed on the 128-bit XOR arbiter PUF, the input training
data needs to be replaced with the original input challenge (c1 , c2 , ..., c128 )2 . This means the
elements of the 32 × 4 × 1 matrix C ∗ in Fig. 6.3 are substituted with c1 , c2 , ..., c128 . After
training the CNNs associated with the regular CNN attack with 150,000 data, the training
(testing) accuracy is about 0.658 (0.633) if the number of epochs is set as 40, as shown in
Fig. 6.5(a). Moreover, Fig. 6.5(b) reflects a much higher training (testing) loss will occur
under the regular CNN attack.

6.4 CONCLUSION

A novel side-channel (SC)-assisted convolutional neural network (CNN) attack is proposed in this letter to model non-linear PUFs: XOR PUFs. By utilizing SC analyses to add
strong correlation among the input training data, the training/testing accuracy of the CNN

107
attack is improved over 0.98. By contrast, the training/testing accuracy of a regular CNN
attack is about 0.64 without the assistance of the strong correlation.
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CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

Physical unclonable function (PUF) research is a core topic in the domain of hardware
security. Workload aware multi-phases voltage regulator (WAMPVR) PUFs utilize capacitance differences as compared parameter and introduce serial diode sets to increase the
non-linearity in voltage signals. Wave dynamic differential logic (WDDL) PUF introduce
an existing side-channel-resistant hardware component into PUF design. By utilizing a nonlinear function on circuit level, the power entropy is greatly promoted, enhancing the PUF
resilience to ML attacks and SCA attacks. Although both PUF designs are proved to be
robust to non-invasive attacks. The usage of non-linear function, however, introduces more
randomness in circuit function, providing additional stability and robustness against more
advanced ML attack models.
Compared to WAMPVR PUF and WDDL PUF, the conceptual design of PUF-AESPUF architecture considers more vulnerable leakage paths of confidential information. If
a cryptographic circuit is planed in the middle of the circuit, both input power trace and
output power trace are obscure to attackers. While one end of both PUFs are not open to
attackers, attackers can no longer perform modeling attacks solely on a single protection
mechanism. The uncertainties induced by secret key also enhance the PUF robustness to
deep neural network (DNN) models.
Suppose the PUF primitive is implemented with an unwilling Trojan inclusion in the
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fabrication process, the relationship between input physical signal and output digital responses are revealed to attackers. Comparing to an integral PUF protection, the Trojan
inclusion eliminates most uncertainties on devices, resulting in a vulnerability to ML modeling attacks and succedent SCA attacks. If the existence of Trojan can be aware of, since
the Trojan will alter the electrical signal in an unnatural manner, the sensed data will no
longer conform to Gaussian distribution. Thus, the statistical method is effective in the
detection of hardware Trojans.
In addition, to some floorplans with simple or single protection mechanisms, a profiling
attack model jointly using ML attack models and SCA attack approach can easily penetrate
the secure hardware model. With the participance of SCA approach, more circuit features
are extracted from leakage signals. The possibility to crack non-linear XOR PUF is thus
promoted to 0.98, comparing to the accuracy of 0.65 under a simple CNN attack model.
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CHAPTER 8

FUTURE WORK

8.1 MACHINE LEARNING-BASED PHYSICAL UNCLONABLE
FUNCTION (PUF)-LIKE MODULES
In the whole dissertation, all subjects are around the concept to enhancing the internal
algorithm logic/non-linearity against ML attacks and/or SCA attacks. To a certain extent,
the enhancement of algorithm does increase the robustness to both attack models. However,
the comparison logic, after all, is based on two sets of hardware modules. Any increments in
algorithm complexity will result in additional consumption in area, power budget, etc. As
an engineer in hardware security, our ultimate goal is to use resources as little as possible to
resolve potential threats ultimately. Therefore, based on the same topic of PUF, is there any
solution that holds confidentiality, flexibility, and expansibility at the same time? Under
this assumption, we believe the combination of ML algorithms and PUF primitives can be
a promising research topic in this area.
First of all, same as all cryptographic-purpose system, the architecture of all PUF primitive are public, while the concrete variable/key details of inner components are kept as
secret information. This theory does not only facilitate the information exchange in cryptographic system, but also enables hardware designers take advantage of known secret inner
components in their architecture designs. However, in view of current hardware architecture
and hardware security theory, the bottleneck of PUF industry is the rigid restriction of area
and power budget stipulate the scale of PUF as well as its internal algorithm complexity.
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Fig. 8.1: Conceptual floorplan of neural network PUF-like module.

Under this situation, a PUF primitive may always be compromised with a modeling attack
under a finite time complexity. In addition, from the perspective of all proposed PUF designs, all uncertainties are fixed when the PUF layout is decided. In accompany with a
finite algorithm complexity, the series of Taylor expansion cannot be too large, resulting in
vulnerabilities in differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis. And that is also why
we introduce artificial uncertainty dimensions in Chapter 4. Furthermore, with the advent
of machine learning algorithm and quantum computers in the foreseeable future, all current
cryptographic algorithms with fixed complexity or finite uncertainties may be cracked with
more advanced modeling algorithms.
In view of all aforementioned problems, one promising future work is to exploit machine
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learning architecture as PUF-like hardware architecture. Please kindly note that the conceptual architecture is not simply from manufacture uncertainties as conventional designs. As
is shown in Fig. 8.1 is conceptual floorplan of neural network PUF-like module. Similar to
regular PUF architecture, the input layer and the output layer stipulate the dimension of the
challenge signal and response signal. The hidden layer forms the internal arithmetic logic of
the PUF module. Different from regular neural network architecture, not all nodes in hidden
layers are utilized, as well as their corresponding connection weights. Comparing to conventional PUF architecture, the conceptual PUF-like module has following features. First, the
architecture is analogous to field programming gate array (FPGA). Since not all internal
logic/arithmetic nodes will be used, hardware designers can decide which nodes/weights are
to be used in either training process or validation process. Besides, the growth of machine
learning algorithms makes it possible to embed NN-based hardware module into chip layouts. Once the NN module is embedded onto hardware architectures, Node weights of the
network module can be rewritten in execution. This means the network module can be
designed for multi-purposes. If the system asks for a key or an authentication code, the
neural network can terminate the regular work for several cycles and generate some pairs of
CRPs. This greatly reduces the overhead that introduces a non-systematical functional unit
into hardware designs. Last but not least, more uncertainty dimensions will be introduced
with this design. On the one hand, the number of input nodes and output nodes are uncertain. Hardware designers can design their specific mappings from challenges to responses,
which gives great degree of freedom in security designs. On the other hand, since the usage
of nodes are not fixed. Even attackers are able to compromise one network architecture,
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security supervisors can always alter the network structure or change connection weights
as new safety strategies. Although some details in realizations are not well considered, this
conceptual architecture can still be one promising research directions in the future.

8.2 LOW/REDUCED OVERHEAD PHYSICAL UNCLONABLE
FUNCTION DEVICES
Similar to every innovate idea and designs in hardware industry, PUF primitives, after
all, are still hardware devices and is of commodity value attributes. Except for the infinite
pursuit on security attributes, another crucial design principle of PUF is the reduction
of excess overhead on area, power, and all other physical dimensions that may degrade the
overall performance of the computer system. Though protection mechanisms on the software
system also requires the actual impact as few as possible, comparing to the total resources
on hardware architectures, software security strategies, like AES and RSA cryptography,
possesses relative unlimited computational resources and can be optimized on the algorithm
level. A more real question that the PUF industry has to face is no matter how efficient
the PUF can be exploited as hardware security strategies, if the degradation of performance
is not negligible, any PUF-based security chip will be weak in market competitions. As
the final tradeoff in the market place, PUF, as an additional security module, is the first
one to be sacrificed. Eventually, the last but not least barrier before PUF devices can be
negotiated to large-scale applications is the overhead problem.
In previous sections, most words underline the promotion of security of PUF against
potential attacking models, to be specific, ML attacks and SCA attacks. In Chapter 2
and Chapter 3, we manage to exploit existing hardware architectures or mechanisms as the
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Fig. 8.2: Illustration of PUF realization using on-chip scan structure [7].

basis of innovate PUF primitives. And in Chapter 4, our strategy is to use existing lowoverhead designs (RO PUF) and essential security modules (AES cryptographic circuit) to
reconstruct a PUF logic. Since all architecture designs utilize existing modules on system, no
discussions are developed in details on further reducing consumption on hardware resources
in hardware system, though we equally believe the overhead problem is not negligible in more
severe security markets in the touchable future. However, considering hardware threats are
already proposed and studied by both researchers and “evils behind computers”, we cannot
wait for the emergence of attacks, and not until then did we equip our hardware system
with PUF primitives. Therefore, we choose to investigate the feasibility of most accessible
architectures at first and regard the deduction of resource usage as future works.
According to accessible literatures, early discussions on low overhead PUF designs are
no later than 2008 [94], though designs of PUF primitives can be traced back to seven years
before [95]. Early works also do not mention too much on power/area budgets, while they
mostly assert the execution time of security authentication is a small proportion comparing
to the time of system usage. A meaningful work on PUF overhead exhibits an experimental
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result on a scanPUF [7], as is shown in Fig. 8.2. In the proposed work, the PUF is realized
on a scan mechanism on two flip-flop paths. And users use experiments on FPGA implementation to prove the innovate PUF consume 11.17% excess area compared to conventional
RO-PUF, while the overall power budget is elevated by 9.65%. In a more recent work, by
introducing mechanism of self-regulation and reconfiguration, [96] designs an inverter-based
PUF with zero-overhead stabilization scheme. Based on our current work, the security attribute is still our priority in PUF designs, in which we are aiming to an ultimate and general
solution to all current malicious attacks in hardware system. As a result, one possible research work in the future should be the overhead reduction of our current PUF-AES-PUF
architecture, since it is believed to be most robustness in all our current designs. Another
possible work can be the arithmetic redesign on PUF comparison. As is stated in previous
sections, the non-linearity is a key factor in evaluating PUF performance. We may think of
a low-overhead comparison system that balance the resource budget and the non-linearity
simultaneously.
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